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The Federalist Regulation of Privacy: The 
Happy Incidents of State Regulatory Activity 




I.  INTRODUCTION  
The impact of society’s digital integration is difficult to articulate.  It suf-
fices to say much of our lives are now digitized, and digital technologies have 
yielded immeasurable benefits to the individual and society at large.  Change 
heralds challenge, and the digital paradigm-shift has brought challenges of 
comparable numerosity and magnitude.  Privacy is at the forefront of those 
challenges.  In recent years, the digital industry has been subject to increased 
scrutiny over the rising number of privacy scandals and perceived market fail-
ures related to the collection and use of individuals’ personal information.1  
New technologies, market developments, and increases in public attention have 
culminated in widespread perceptions of privacy threats and abuses.2  Govern-
ments around the globe are responding by revamping their regulation of pri-
vacy and the digital industry.3  In stark contrast, the United States federal gov-
ernment has maintained its rudimental self-regulatory approach.4  A handful of 
  
* B.S. Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Tulane University, 2017; J.D. Candidate, Uni-
versity of Missouri School of Law, 2020.  I would like to thank Professors R. Lawrence 
Dessem and Dennis Crouch for their guidance during the writing of this Comment, as well 
as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.                     
 1. See, e.g., Rosie Perper, New Zealand’s Privacy Commissioner Lashes Out at 
Facebook, Calling Those Behind the Company ‘Morally Bankrupt Pathological Liars’, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/new-zealand-pri-
vacy-commissioner-calls-facebook-morally-bankrupt-pathological-liars-2019-4 
[perma.cc/HVC4-G8CQ]; see also Inge Graef, et al., Fairness and Enforcement: Bridg-
ing Competition, Data Protection and Consumer Law, 8 INT’L DATA AND PRIVACY L. 
3, 200 (Nov. 18, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipy013 [perma.cc/4Z9V-ARG8] 
(“Recent years have shown a surge of interest from various enforcement agencies to 
remedy commercial behaviour exploiting the increasing information and power asym-
metries between consumers and firms.”). 
 2. Graef, supra note 1, at 202.  
 3. Bennett Cyphers, et al., Data Privacy Scandals and Public Policy Picking Up 
Speed: 2018 in Review, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 31, 2018), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/12/data-privacy-scandals-and-public-policy-pick-
ing-speed-2018-year-review [perma.cc/EY6E-KKXS]. 
 4. ALAN MCQUINN & DANIEL CASTRO, A GRAND BARGAIN ON DATA PRIVACY 
LEGISLATION FOR AMERICA 2 (Jan. 2019), http://www2.itif.org/2019-grand-bargain-
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states, spearheaded by California’s enaction of the California Consumer Pri-
vacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), have moved to fill the gap left by federal inac-
tion.5  The scope of the CCPA is unrivalled by any previous United States pri-
vacy regulation, and with its activation date quickly approaching, industry ac-
tors have focused their lobbying efforts in Washington D.C. to the increasing 
reception of federal legislators.6  Any congressional action could have major 
repercussions for state and federal regulators’ ability to police the collection 
and use of citizens’ personal information, and accordingly, such action may 
redefine privacy in the United States.  The present scenario raises important 
questions about federalism and novel informational privacy regulations.  Few 
commentators have addressed the issue directly,7 and no one has done so re-
cently.  What role should the federal government and states play in addressing 
the privacy concerns of Americans?  Should the federal government preempt 
the CCPA and its progeny in favor of active federal regulation of the digital 
industry’s collection and use of personal information?  What are the conse-
quences of allowing the CCPA and similar state laws to regulate the control of 
their citizens’ personal information?  This Comment will explore such ques-
tions.  
Section II briefly introduces contemporary understandings of privacy to 
contextualize the privacy challenges United States regulators currently face.  




 5. Mitchell Noordyke, US State Privacy Comprehensive Law Comparison, INT’L 
ASSOC. OF PRIVACY PROF’LS, INC. (Apr. 18, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/us-state-
comprehensive-privacy-law-comparison/ [perma.cc/LH63-CBCE]. 
 6. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science & Trans-
portation, Wicker to Hold Hearing Examining Consumer Data Privacy Issues, (Feb. 8, 
2019), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/2/wicker-to-hold-
hearing-examining-consumer-data-privacy-issues [perma.cc/JQ37-F7KA] (“It is this 
committee’s responsibility and obligation to develop a federal privacy standard to pro-
tect consumers without stifling innovation, investment, or competition . . . I hope this 
first hearing will offer valuable insights that will help set the stage for meaningful bi-
partisan legislation.”).  However, the recent stir in Congress may simply fall through, 
as have numerous previous attempts of federal level privacy legislation. See Richard 
M. Marsh, Jr., Legislation for Effective Self-Regulation: A New Approach to Protecting 
Personal Privacy on the Internet, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 543, 556–59 
(2009) (discussing previous, and fruitless, federal consideration of enacting privacy 
legislation).  
 7. Concerning the regulation of private actors, others have addressed federalism 
in both the data security and cybersecurity contexts, but the author is only aware of the 
following inquiries into data privacy regulations: Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and 
Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 904 (2009); Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Infor-
mation Privacy Law, 118 YALE L.J. 868, 870 (2009); Tony Glosson, Data Privacy in 
Our Federalist System: Toward an Evaluative Framework for State Privacy Laws, 67 
FED. COMM. L.J. 409, 411 (2015) (approaching the issue with constitutional analysis 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause). 
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issues.  Section IV focuses on privacy regulation at the state-level, emphasizing 
the complex relationship between federal and state regulators in national re-
sponses to emerging privacy issues.  Section V then explains the history and 
structure of the CCPA before Section VI assesses the implications of the 
CCPA’s enaction and the likely response of federal regulators, concluding with 
the assertion that strict preemptive action could result in less effective national 
regulation and prohibit state government attempts to address harm to their con-
stituents. If Congress genuinely wishes to address widespread privacy con-
cerns, it should do so carefully in a way that preserves the ability of states to 
regulate freely in the area.  
II.  PRIVACY: BACKGROUND AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 
The interesting thing about privacy is “nobody seems to have any very 
clear idea what it is.”8  Labeling privacy as a coherent and consistent right, 
rather than an evolving conception of social necessity subject to change, sim-
plifies the reality of this “messy and complex subject.”9  Concise, holistic def-
initions of privacy have evaded scholars since Justice Louis Brandeis and Sam-
uel Warren proffered “The Right of Privacy” to American law.10  Brandeis and 
Warren were concerned that new technologies, specifically cameras, would en-
able private actors to intrude on the privacy of other individuals.11  As “perhaps 
the most famous and certainly the most influential law review article ever writ-
ten,”12 their work went on to inspire a century of scholarship which has culmi-
nated in the irreconcilable “divergent strands” of theory that comprise modern 
  
 8. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 295, 295 
(1975); Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Privacy Harms, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 
1039, 1044 (2018) (“In the forty years since she made this observation, the literature 
has made little progress on this front.”). 
 9. HELLEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND 
THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 67 (2010); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 
90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1093 (2002) (“Privacy does not have a universal value that is 
the same across all contexts.  The value of privacy in a particular context depends upon 
the social importance of the practice of which it is a part.”). 
 10. The two characterized individual privacy as the “right to be let alone.” Samuel 
D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 
(1890); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001) 
(“Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimen-
sions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether 
it can be usefully addressed at all.”). 
 11. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 195; Cofone & Robertson, supra note 8, 
at 1045. 
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privacy law.13  The strand of “informational privacy” provides a foundation for 
understanding privacy in our digital era.  
A.  INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE 
At the emergence of computer technologies in the 1960s, Alan Westin 
described “informational privacy” as the power of “individuals, groups, or in-
stitutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent infor-
mation about them is communicated to others.”14  Westin’s concept of infor-
mational privacy began the “privacy-control” paradigm that forms the basis of 
modern informational privacy law.15  Privacy-control emphasizes individuals’ 
ability to control and limit access to information about themselves.16  In the 
modern digital era, privacy scholars and legislative frameworks have “gravi-
tated towards the idea of privacy as a personal right to control the use of one's 
data.”17  
The era of “big data” has revived the subject of informational privacy.18  
Emerging technologies have created “novel forms of data flow,”19 much of 
  
 13. See, e.g., Post, supra note 10, at 2087; Solove, supra note 9, at 1092 (content-
ing all previous “attempts to conceptualize privacy by locating the common denomina-
tor to identify all instances of privacy have thus far been unsatisfying.”); Ruth Gavi-
son, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422 (1980) (attempting to define 
privacy as a “distinct and coherent” concept); Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect 
of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 963 (1964) 
(“My purpose . . . is to propose a general theory of individual privacy [to] reconcile the 
divergent strands of legal development-which will put the straws back into the hay-
stack. The need for such a theory is pressing.”); KENT GREENAWALT, LEGAL 
PROTECTIONS OF PRIVACY: FINAL REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
POLICY 3 (1976) (“Few concepts are more elusive than privacy and attempts at defini-
tion have inevitably either been too vague to be of much help or too narrow to catch all 
aspects of the concept.”). 
 14. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); Paul M. Schwartz, Pri-
vacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1660 (1999) (“The con-
ventional wisdom seeks to place the individual at the center of decisionmaking about 
personal information use by conceiving of privacy as a right of control over data use.”). 
 15. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1659. 
 16. Cofone & Robertson, supra note 8, at 1045; Solove, supra note 9, at 1105–06. 
 17. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1659. 
 18. Big Data “has commonly come to represent the drastic increase in the volume, 
variety, and velocity of data that can be analyzed.” Joseph Jerome, Big Data: Catalyst 
for a Privacy Conversation, 48 IND.  L. REV. 213, 214 (2014); BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR 
INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 
2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-
exclusion-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf [perma.cc/25HK-J26N]. 
 19. Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 157, 158 (2019). 
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which consists of “personal information” relating to individuals.20  The digital 
industry recognized the profit-potential of collecting, processing, and selling 
personal information decades ago.21  As the market has developed, that value 
has incentivized the proliferation of practices and technologies that “preserve 
the current status quo of maximum information disclosure.”22  That trend has 
only intensified as new technologies and the “Internet of Things”23 integrate 
consumer products into the digital ecosystem, exacerbating privacy concerns 
by exponentially increasing the volume, quality, and value of personal infor-
mation collected from individuals.24  The result is “some of our most sensitive 
information ends up amassed in giant, unstructured pools of information kept 
by tech industry giants.”25  The United States’ current informational privacy 
  
 20. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a 
New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1850 
(2011); Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1134 (2015). 
 21. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1689–90 (“For the current online industry, more-
over, personal information largely has the quality of nonrivalrous consumption, which 
means that one firm’s utilization of it does not leave less for any other company. As a 
result, almost all major Internet enterprises and computer companies benefit from de-
veloping standards, including new technology, that preserve the current status quo of 
maximum information disclosure.”).  
 22. Id.  
 23. The “internet of things” is the synthesis of everyday, and often household, 
items with internet and wireless technologies.  It “is the concept of basically connecting 
any device with an on and off switch to the Internet (and/or to each other).  This includes 
everything from cellphones, coffee makers, washing machines, headphones, lamps, 
wearable devices and almost anything else you can think of.” Jacob Morgan, A Simple 
Explanation Of ‘The Internet Of Things’, FORBES (May 13, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-
things-that-anyone-can-understand/#19fe9d191d09 [perma.cc/754T-QJSR]; Ejaz Ah-
med, et al., The Role of Big Data Analytics in the Internet of Things, 129 COMPUTER 
NETWORKS 2, 459 (2017), https://www.researchgate.net/publica-
tion/317617290_The_role_of_big_data_analytics_in_Internet_of_Things (“The explo-
sive growth in the number of devices connected to the Internet of Things (IoT) and the 
exponential increase in data consumption only reﬂect how the growth of big data per-
fectly overlaps with that of IoT.”); Jane E. Kirly & Scott Memmel, Rewriting the “Book 
of the Machine”: Regulatory and Liability Issues for the Internet of Things, 19 MINN. 
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 455, 458 (citing industry estimates of internet of things growth). 
 24. See Kirly & Memmel, supra note 23, at 458; Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying 
Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 437–38 (2018) 
(citing Dimiter v.  Dimitrov, Medical Internet of Things and Big Data in Healthcare, 
22 HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS RES. 156, 156 (2016)). 
 25. Ohm, supra note 20, at 1193 (“Google holds every search query each of us has 
ever entered, and many have documented how this represents our ‘database of inten-
tions,’ perhaps the largest database of sensitive information on earth.  Facebook main-
tains a similarly sensitive database of past photos, videos, and status updates.  And email 
providers store massive repositories of sensitive messages.  But every one of these pro-
viders differs from Health Vault and Mint by collecting sensitive information inci-
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predicament was anticipated and reported to federal lawmakers nearly four 
decades ago:  
[N]ongovernmental invasions of privacy are not limited to individual 
efforts.  Corporations, financial institutions, and other large organiza-
tions all seek to compile information on individuals and employ that 
information to their own benefit.  Often the information is obtained, di-
rectly or indirectly, from an individual who agreed to permit collection 
of the data for a particular reason; but the data is frequently centrally 
compiled and used for other purposes, ultimately giving the entity hold-
ing the information tremendous economic, social and even political lev-
erage over the individual.  In effect, private institutions have acquired 
some of the coercive capability which hitherto had been an exclusive 
power of government.  We face a future where information will play a 
central role, where control of information about a person could be tan-
tamount to controlling that person.26 
While there are benefits to the digital industry’s expansion,27 there are 
also great harms.28  Privacy harms, like the definition of privacy itself, are sub-
ject to continuous discussion.29  Whether you characterize privacy harms as 
  
dentally, not in a targeted matter.  And these providers also store this sensitive infor-
mation commingled with less sensitive and nonsensitive information.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 26. Greenawalt, supra note 13, at ix–x. 
 27. See WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 382–83 
(2016) (“[I]ncreased processing and use of personal data is inevitable and offers enor-
mous value to society.”). 
 28. See Ohm, supra note 20, at 1190. 
 29. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 
1132 (2011) (reviewing privacy harms and delineating them as subjective and objec-
tive); see also Ohm, supra note 20, at 1125 (reviewing privacy harms); Schwartz, supra 
note 14, at 1656 (personal autonomy); Jerome, supra note 18, at 241 (societal trust); 
Patrick F. Gallagher, The Internet Website Privacy Policy: A Complete Misnomer?, 35 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 373, 380 (2001) (reputational harm); Nathan Newman, The Costs 
of Lost Privacy: Consumer Harm and Rising Economic Inequality in the Age of Google, 
40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 849, 852 (2014) (discussing cumulative harms from data 
mining and behavior advertising); Scott J. Shackelford, When Toasters Attack: A Pol-
ycentric Approach to Enhancing the “Security of Things,” 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 
440–41 (2017) (discussing the “myriad of ways” consumers can be harmed, including 
bad credit ratings); Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recom-
mendations for Businesses and Policymakers, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2012) 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-
report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326priva-
cyreport.pdf [perma.cc/KWY7-WLZF]; Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving 
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objective or subjective,30 the increased concerns of individuals are evidence of 
some harm occurring.31  Advancements in consumer technologies exacerbate 
privacy concerns and increase the already widespread calls for protective leg-
islation.32  However, United States regulators, particularly at the federal level, 
“have lagged in grappling with the new problems raised by the digital revolu-
tion.”33  
III.  OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S REGULATION OF 
PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
The United States “famously does not have omnibus federal data privacy 
law.”34  Rather than regulate the digital industry’s collection and use of per-
sonal information in a cohesive framework, Congress has selected certain in-
dustries and “sensitive” information types to receive heightened regulation, re-
sulting in a legislative patchwork of sectorial federal regulations.  Within those 
expressly regulated areas, federal agencies actively promulgate rules and police 
the collection of digital information with civil actions.  Outside of that patch-
work, the collection and use of personal information is not regulated through 
codified rules, and industry entities can self-regulate their data practices with 
minimal policing from federal regulators.  The Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) is the primary regulator of the federal scheme, and as the de facto 
digital specialist for the past two decades, the agency has garnished the infor-
mal title of the “Federal Technology Commission.”35  
  
[perma.cc/LW68-7A79] (acknowledging tangible to intangible harms to individuals 
and groups). 
 30. See Calo, supra note 29, at 1131. 
 31. Defining privacy harms is outside the scope of this discussion of increased 
U.S. informational privacy regulations.  We continue by assuming privacy harms are 
both tangible and intangible, and that such intangible privacy harms are largely a result 
of contextual societal and perceptions of digital industry abuse. See Solove, supra note 
9, at 1093 (“The value of privacy in a particular context depends upon the social im-
portance of the practice of which it is a part.”). 
 32. Terrell McSweeny, Psychographics, Predictive Analytics, Artificial Intelli-
gence, & Bots: Is the FTC Keeping Pace?, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 514, 518–19 (2018) 
(citing WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE 
DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 5 (2018)). 
 33. Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review Obfusca-
tion: A User’s Guide for Privacy and Protest by Finn Brunton and Helen Nissenbaum 
Cambridge and London: The MIT Press 2015, 126 YALE L.J. 1180, 1182 (2017). 
 34. Margot E. Kaminski, When the Default Is No Penalty: Negotiating Privacy at 
the NTIA., 93 DENV. L. REV. 925, 926 (2016) (citing Paul M. Schwartz, The Value of 
Privacy Federalism, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 324, 324–27 (2015)).   
 35. Omar Tene, With Ramirez, the FTC Became the Federal Technology Commis-
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A.  The Sectorial Patchwork of Federal Privacy Regulations: The 
FTC’s Active Regulation by Rulemaking and Enforcement in Limited 
Areas  
In the words of the current FTC commissioner Noah Phillips, it “is not an 
accident of history” that federal regulation “focuses privacy and security rules 
on the sectors of the economy where Congress has determined such rules are 
most needed.”36  As noted by Phillips, federal lawmakers have deemed certain 
types of information “sensitive” enough to warrant formal federal regulation,37  
and the result is the handful of narrow privacy laws tailored to specific sectors 
of the economy.38  The sectorial framework regulates “limited types of infor-
mation, in limited situations,”39 and each statute empowers a federal agency, 
commonly the FTC, to promulgate rules and police entity compliance.40  
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”) is one 
law in the patchwork that empowers the FTC to protect children’s personal 
information.41  COPPA requires the FTC to promulgate and enforce rules to 
give the parents of children “under the age of 13”42 the ability to control private 
entities’ collection and use of their children’s data.43  COPPA’s privacy provi-
sions prohibit the collection and use of child information without first obtaining 
  
 36. Noah Joshua Phillips, “Keep It: Maintaining Competition in the Privacy De-
bate”, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/pub-
lic_statements/1395934/phillips_-_internet_governance_forum_7-27-18.pdf 
[perma.cc/83PB-N85P]. 
 37. Id.  
 38. The nature of the sectorial approach has been criticized as inflexible.  For ex-
ample, there is much uncertainty surrounding the application of HIPAA, the federal 
statute regulating medical records discussed in note 24, to the emerging wearable tech-
nology and mobile health industry.  See Elvy, supra note 24, at 498 (internal citation 
omitted); J. Frazee, et al., mHealth and Unregulated Data: Is this Farewell to Patient 
Privacy?, 13 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 385, 392 (2016).   
 39. Rebecca Lipman, Online Privacy and the Invisible Market for Our Data, 120 
PENN. ST. L. REV. 777, 787–88 (2016).   
 40. See Bruce P. Smith, Hacking, Poaching, and Counterattacking: Digital Coun-
terstrikes and the Contours of Self-Help, 1 J.L.  ECON.  & POL’Y 171, 173 (2005).  
 41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2018); 16 C.F.R. §§ 312 et seq. (2018) (accompanying 
regulations).   
 42. 15 U.S.C § 6501(1) (2018).  
 43. § 6502(b) (listing the specific requirements under the act); FTC Strengthens 
Kids’ Privacy, Gives Parents Greater Control Over Their Information by Amending 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, FED. TRADE COMM’N,  
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/12/ftc-strengthens-kids-privacy-
gives-parents-greater-control-over [perma.cc/LDR6-LURU] (“The Federal Trade 
Commission adopted final amendments to the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Rule that strengthen kids’ privacy protections and give parents greater control over the 
personal information that websites and online services may collect from children under 
13.”); Statutes Enforced or Administered by the Commission, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
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meaningful consent from parents.44  Covered entities must provide parents 
clear access to a document detailing their COPPA rights and the specific en-
tity’s privacy policy.45  COPPA’s privacy provisions empower parents with 
rights: to know what information is collected from their children;46 to know 
how the entity uses that information;47 to know if and how the entity discloses 
that information to third-parties;48 to review any information the entity has al-
ready collected;49 to delete any collected information;50 and to revoke their 
prior consent to the entity’s practices.51  COPPA’s data security provisions en-
sure the continued integrity of children’s data collected and maintained by the 
entity.52  
Other areas in the federal privacy-regulation patchwork that empower the 
FTC include the regulation of consumer credit information under the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),53 financial information under the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act,54 commercial emailing practices under the CAN-SPAM 
Act,55 and consumer health data, which is not subject to Department of Health 
and Human Services’ jurisdiction under the Health Portability and Accounta-
bility Act (“HIPAA”),56 under the Health Information Technology Provisions 
of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.57  
  
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes [perma.cc/DP4J-65Q2] (“This Act [COPPA] 
protects children's privacy by giving parents tools to control what information is col-
lected from their children online.”). 
 44. 16 C.F.R. § 312.3 (2018) (listing privacy rights under the act). 
 45. § 312.4(d). 
 46. § 312.4(b). 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. § 312.6 (“Right of parent to review personal information provided by a child.”) 
 50. Id.  
 51. § 312.4(d)(2)–(3). 
 52. § 312.8.  
 53. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018). 
 54. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09 (2018); 16 C.F.R. § 314 
(2018) (accompanying regulations).    
 55. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 7701–7713 (2018). 
 56. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered U.S.C. §§ 26, 29 & 42 (2018)); 
see 45 C.F.R. §§ 160–164 (2018).  
 57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 17937(a),17937(g) (2018); see, e.g., Health Breach Notification 
Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 318 (2009) (empowering the FTC to promulgate regulatory require-
ments for entities that breach health information). 
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B.  Federal Regulation Outside of the Privacy Patchwork: The FTC’s 
Passive Approach to Policing Industry Collection and Use of Personal 
Information  
Digital industry entities are generally allowed to self-regulate their col-
lection and use of individuals’ personal information with minimal federal over-
sight, the bulk of which is comprised of the FTC’s retroactive enforcement ac-
tions against deceptive or unfair practices.  Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act (“FTCA”) authorizes the FTC to bring civil enforcement actions 
against private entities using “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affect-
ing commerce.”58  While the FTC’s Section 5 authority predates modern digital 
technologies,59 the agency first applied the enforcement powers to the digital 
sphere in the late 1990s after the need for internet privacy protections became 
evident.60  The FTC’s regulation has greatly expanded since 1998.  
The FTC’s Section 5 enforcement is the only source of federal privacy 
protections outside of the sectorial legislative patchwork.61  As of early 2016, 
the agency had brought “over 500 cases” to uphold the “privacy and security 
of consumer information.”62  The approach has resulted in the “FTC Common 
Law,”63 which is essentially a growing list of information privacy and security 
no-no’s.64  The FTC’s enforcement-based regulation under Section 5 acts as a 
  
 58. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018); Woodrow Hart-
zog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2246 (2015) (stating “the concepts of deceptiveness and unfair-
ness in the FTC Act are intentionally defined at an extremely broad level.”); 15 U.S.C. 
§6502(b) (2018) (listing the specific requirements under the act).    
 59. See Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111 (1938). 
 60. The humble origins of the FTC’s transformation into the “Federal Technology 
Commission” followed from its first online privacy action against the private entity 
GeoCities in 1998. For perspective, only 2% of internet sites provided user privacy 
policies at that time.  Phillips, supra note 36; Privacy Online: A Report to Congress, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N (1998), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/re-
ports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf [perma.cc/F92G-2R6Y]. 
 61. See infra Section III(A).  
 62. Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the Federal 




 63. Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data Security and the FTC’s Uncommon Law, 101 
IOWA L. REV. 955, 966 (2016) (“In recent years, the Commission has begun referring 
to its consumer protection efforts – especially those based in its unfairness authority 
and those relating to privacy and data security – as developing a ‘common law’ body 
of rules.”). 
 64. LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221, 1232 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(explaining the generation of FTC common law through case-by-case litigation). 
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flexible substitute for static federal statutes.  Despite its flexibility, the self-
regulatory approach has its limitations.65 
Section 5 prohibits two distinct forms of conduct: “deceptive” practices 
and “unfair” practices.66  The FTC most commonly enforces Section 5’s pro-
hibition of “deceptive practices.”67  Entities are liable under Section 5’s prohi-
bition of “deceptive practice” for any “representation, omission, or practice” 
that is “material and likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the 
circumstances.”68  FTC enforcement actions against deceptive practices allow 
the agency to presume consumer harm while reserving discretion to bring en-
forcement actions.69  The retroactive enforcement approach allows private en-
tities to “self-regulate” by publishing their own promises and implementing 
practices sufficient to maintain those promises.70  In contrast to the FTC’s reg-
ulation of “deceptive” practices, Section 5’s vague prohibition of “unfair” prac-
tices prohibits practices that cause or are likely to cause “substantial injury to 
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”71  De-
spite the theoretical flexibility Section 5’s unfairness prohibition provides the 
FTC with its proactive prohibition and vague definition, the agency’s enforce-
ment jurisprudence against unfair practices remains largely undeveloped72 and 
  
 65. Despite the smart-TV industry failing to ensure “private consumer data is ad-
equately encrypted, and that consumers understand that their viewing habits and even 
some in-room conversations are being hoovered up and monetized,” their practices are 
not prohibited under the FTC’s current framework. See Jane Kirtley & Scott Mem-
mel, Too Smart for Its Own Good: Addressing the Privacy and Security Challenges of 
the Internet of Things, 22 J. INTERNET L. 1, 20 (2018). 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018). 
 67. Id.  
 68. Letter from Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed Trade Comm’n, to Věra 
Jourová, Commissioner for Justice, Consumers, and Gender Equality, European Com-
mission, Describing Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of the New EU-U.S. Pri-
vacy Shield Framework, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb.  23, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2016/02/letter-chairwoman-edith-ramirez-
vera-jourova-commissioner-justice [perma.cc/5Y8G-VC53]. 
 69. Philip J. Weiser, Entrepreneurial Administration, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2011, 2061 
(2017) (internal citations omitted).  
 70. Id. at 2062.  
 71. 14 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2018).  
 72. Terrell McSweeny, Psychographics, Predictive Analytics, Artificial Intelli-
gence, & Bots: Is the FTC Keeping Pace?, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 514, 520 (2018) (stat-
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is “more controversial and susceptible to legal challenges.”73  While rare,74 pri-
vate entities have challenged FTC enforcement actions judicially, but those 
challenges were largely unsuccessful prior to 2018.75  Recently, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rebuked the FTC’s exercise of its unfairness 
jurisprudence, concluding the FTC’s attempted prohibition applied “a scheme 
Congress could not have envisioned.”76  
The FTC’s impromptu regulation of digital industry privacy abuses has 
been controversial.  Its ability to address national privacy concerns with Sec-
tion 5 is severely lacking due to the agency’s limited capacity, expanding reg-
ulatory responsibilities, and fundamental approach to policing privacy 
abuses.77  Current78 and former FTC officials have openly voiced concerns 
about the agency’s regulatory capabilities.79  The fifty-two employees80 in the 
FTC’s Division of Privacy and Identity Protection are tasked with regulating 
the entire United States’ economy for not only for privacy abuses but abuses 
related to identity theft and data security as well.81  The amount of emerging 
platforms, technologies, and practices subject to FTC regulation is increasing 
at a tremendous pace, yet novel threats to consumer privacy remain un-
addressed82 until sufficient public outcry catalyzes the FTC to act.83  Even 
  
 73. Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985, 1012 
(2018). 
 74. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common 
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 610–11 (2014) (noting the lack of judicial 
challenges in FTC enforcement actions against unfair data practices).   
 75. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Com’n v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (stating that Section 5(a) of “the FTCA enables the FTC to take action 
against unfair practices that have not yet been contemplated by more specific laws.”); 
see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v.  Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 617 
(D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (rejecting the argument that the FTC 
failed to provide notice of what constitutes an unfair practice and that an FTC action 
alleging “unfair” data security practices requires the violation a specifically promul-
gated rule).   
 76. LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 77. See, e.g., McSweeny, supra note 72, at 520. 
 78. Oversight of the Federal Trade Commission: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
On Dig. Commerce and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
115th Cong. (2018) (statement of FTC Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter). 
 79. McSweeny, supra note 72, at 520. 




 81. See Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N., 
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/ourdi-
visions/division-privacy-and-identity [perma.cc/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2019). 
 82. See generally McSweeny, supra note 72, at 514. 
 83. A recent example is the FTC’s enforcement against “robo-calls” under the 
agency’s Telemarketing Sales Rule authority. See Rosario Méndez, Robocallers, 
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when the FTC chooses to exercise its limited capacity, its ability to prevent 
foreseeable harms through enforcement of consent decrees has been criticized 
as ineffective and insufficient,84 for good reason.85  Missouri Senator Josh 
Hawley has repeatedly expressed concerns over the lack of federal regulation 
under the FTC.86  More recently, Senator Hawley and Connecticut Senator 
Richard Blumenthal rebuked the FTC, stating it was time for the agency to 
“learn from a history of broken and under-enforced consent orders.”87  The 
agency itself has repeatedly called for Congress to empower it with the author-
ity to levy civil penalties against private entities.88  Just two months after his 
2018 confirmation, FTC chairman Joseph Simons expressed “serious concern” 
for the agency’s “authority with respect to data security and also privacy,” stat-
ing: “I’m very nervous that we really do not have the remedial authority that 
we need in order to create a sufficient deterrent to deter the kind of conduct 
that we want to deter.”89  Simons cited the agency’s lack of authority to impose 
  
You’re Out, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2019/03/ro-
bocallers-youre-out [perma.cc/GK3F-ZQ5W]. 
 84. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 84, at 605 (2014) (“Indeed, the FTC lacks 
the general authority to issue civil penalties and rarely fines companies for privacy-
related violations under privacy-related statutes or rules that provide for civil penal-
ties.”). 
 85. For example, at the time of the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018, Face-
book had been under a previous FTC consent decree in 2011 concerning privacy viola-
tions. Marc Rotenberg, How the FTC Could Have Prevented the Facebook Mess, 
TECHONOMY (Mar. 22, 2018), https://techonomy.com/2018/03/how-the-ftc-could-
have-avoided-the-facebook-mess/ [perma.cc/3ZHT-BNBS]. 
 86. See e.g., Letter from Josh Hawley, Sen., State of Mo., to Joseph J. Simon, 
Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2019) https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/context/letter-to-the-federal-trade-commission-from-sen-josh-haw-
ley/d10e8794-be00-4f4b-878b-5538779adfbd/ [perma.cc/EKQ6-UJVH]. 
 87. Emily Stewart, Senators on Facebook’s Potential $5 Billion Fine: Not Good 
Enough, VOX (May 7, 2019), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/7/18535631/face-
book-ftc-fine-richard-blumenthal-josh-hawley [perma.cc/H53P-U7TA]. 
 88. For a list of FTC Agency Officials’ calls for increased regulatory power, see 
Consumer Data Privacy: Examining the European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation and the California Consumer Privacy Act, Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
On Commerce, Science, and Transportation, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH., (Oct. 
10, 2018) https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/baf68751-c9bc-
4b15-ab0f-d4a5f719027c/613A226358E5D68237ADC96F3A505F55.moy-2018-10-
10-senate-commerce-written-statement-final.pdf [perma.cc/3UT3-WNM7] (Statement 
of Laura Moy, Executive Director of the Center on Privacy & Technology at 
Georgetown Law). 
 89. C. Ryan Barber, FTC’s Limited Data-Privacy Power Makes Chair Joe Simons 
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civil penalties and the lack of efficient rulemaking authority when stating “Sec-
tion 5 . . . cannot address all privacy and data security concerns in the market-
place[.]”90  
In response to the FTC’s limited regulatory capability, state governments 
have increasingly enacted regulations to address the novel issues emerging 
from the digital industry’s collection and use of personal information.  Many 
of these state responses have contributed to the United States’ legal privacy 
landscape by innovating new regulatory approaches and pioneering new areas 
to regulate, supporting the assertion that state-level regulation is vital for effec-
tive national regulation in the digital sphere.  
IV.  STATE GOVERNMENTS’ ROLE IN REGULATING DIGITAL 
INDUSTRY PRIVACY CONCERNS 
The importance of state-level regulation of privacy was acknowledged as 
far back as 1977 when federal regulators first commended states for creating 
“innovative [privacy] protections . . . in their regulation of private-sector or-
ganizations.”91  Despite the increase in federal privacy regulation since then,92 
that aged sentiment holds true today and the “role of State governments in pro-
tecting personal privacy is . . . still enormously important.”93  
The United States regulation of privacy and the digital industry involves 
a dynamic interplay between state and federal regulators.94  The circumstances 
of these interactions vary, but throughout observed examples, state-level activ-
ity is beneficial for regulation at the national level.  Two general patterns of 
  
 90. Richard E. Gottlieb, FTC Seeks Greater Data Security, Privacy Authority, 
MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP. (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.manatt.com/In-
sights/Newsletters/Financial-Services-Law/FTC-Seeks-Greater-Data-Security-
Privacy-Authority [perma.cc/D74D-ELT8]. 
 91. Personal Privacy in an Information Society, PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY 
COMM’N (1977) (“[T]he significant increase in State regulatory efforts to protect the 
interests of the individual in records kept about him, noted above, has already led a 
number of States to tryout innovative protections, particularly in their regulation of pri-
vate-sector organizations.”). 
 92. See, e.g., the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
6501–6506 (2018); 16 C.F.R. § 412 (2018) (accompanying regulations); Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09 (2018); 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.1–314.5 (2018) (ac-
companying regulations); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 
1232(g) (2018); 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.1–99.8 (2018) (accompanying regulations); Health In-
formation Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered U.S.C. §§ 26, 29 & 42 (2018)); 45 C.F.R. §§ 
160–164 (2018) (accompanying regulations); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§1681 (2018).  
 93. Personal Privacy in an Information Society, supra note 91, at 487. 
 94. See generally Bellia, supra note 7, at 868 (concluding federal preemption of 
certain state privacy regulations is necessary); see also Schwartz, supra note 7, at 902 
(arguing against an omnibus federal privacy law that preempts state regulatory efforts). 
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state involvement are apparent: (1) pioneering state efforts, where states pre-
cede federal regulators either by identifying areas lacking necessary regulation 
or by innovating novel regulatory methods, and (2) gap-filling state efforts, 
where states enforce existing federal laws to maintain effective national regu-
lation and compensate for the limitations of federal regulators. Any future con-
gressional action must carefully weigh the costs and benefits of limiting states’ 
capacity to regulate within the area.  
 
A.  Pioneering Federalism: States Contribute to Effective National 
Regulation by Preceding Federal Action and Experimenting with  
Innovative Regulatory Methods 
 
States continue to play a central role in the United States’ regulation of 
privacy in the evolving digital industry.95  Justice Brandeis rationalized the 
benefits of state regulation in our federalist system nearly a century ago,96 and 
his perspectives remain relevant in the modern digital sphere.97  Brandeis 
opined that “state laboratories” confer national benefits by experimenting with 
novel regulatory methods and identifying new regulatory areas.98  There are 
great advantages to states’ ability to rapidly respond to issues emerging from 
the digital industry.  States are adept at “identify[ing] areas of regulatory sig-
nificance” and taking action,99 which is especially important in the digital 
sphere where “fast-changing new technologies” can give rise to unforeseen 
threats to privacy.100  The relative speed of state legislatures has enabled them 
  
 95. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 917 (“State privacy law has started the twenty-first 
century with renewed activity.”). 
 96. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
state may, if its citizens choose, [1] serve as a laboratory; and [2] try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”); James A. Gardner, The 
New Judicial Federalism: A New Generation Symposium Issue: The “States-as-Labor-
atories” Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475, 478 (1996) 
(interpreting Brandeis as “saying that state experimentation produces beneficial 
knowledge, and that states should therefore be permitted and encouraged to experiment 
to the greatest possible extent.”). 
 97. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 917–18. 
 98. New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see Schwartz, su-
pra note 7, at 917–18. 
 99. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 917; Michael S. Greve, Laboratories of Democracy, 
AM. ENTERPRISE INST., at 1 (2001) (“Successful state and local experiments with airline 
deregulation, welfare reform, and school choice taught valuable lessons, built public 
confidence in innovative policies, and provided a testing ground for social scientists’ 
models and policy recommendations that might well have gone unheeded in a central-
ized political environment.”).  
 100. Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 821 (2001). 
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to precede federal action in many digital industry related areas.101  State regu-
lators confer national benefits by identifying novel targets for regulations and 
crafting experimental regulatory approaches, which provide useful compari-
sons for existing state and federal regulators to modify their approaches ac-
cordingly.102  
A notable example of states responding to emerging digital threats in-
volves data breach notification statutes.103  In an effort to address the increas-
ingly common and harmful practice of unauthorized data access, California pi-
oneered the first data breach notification regulation in 2002 by requiring that 
breached entities notify consumers in the event their personal information was 
compromised.104  By 2007, thirty-three states had enacted similar laws.105  Cal-
ifornia’s regulatory experiment quickly led to numerous federal proposals, 
none of which materialized.106  States compensated for the federal inaction, and 
by 2009, forty-five states had enacted data breach notification laws.107  The 
state-level data breach notification statutes provided federal lawmakers useful 
templates and industry feedback when it finally moved to fill shortcomings the 
state laws highlighted.108  Now, every state and United States territory has en-
acted data breach statutes,109 with which states continue to experiment.110  For 
  
 101. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 917 (discussing state data breach notification 
laws). 
 102. See id. at 918; MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: 
POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 26 (2008) (“[State] variations may ulti-
mately provide information about a range of alternative government policies and enable 
the nation to choose the most desirable one.”). 
 103. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 917. 
 104. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.82 (2017); see Paul M. Schwartz & Edward 
J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 915 (2007). 
 105. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 104, at 915. 
 106. See e.g., Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act, S. 1350, 108th Cong. 
(2003), S. 115, 109th Cong. (2005), S. 751, 109th Cong. (2005), S. 1326, 109th Cong. 
(2005), H.R. 1069, 109th Cong. (2005), H.R. 5582, 109th Cong. (2006), S. 239, 110th 
Cong. (2007), Data Breach Notification Act, S. 139, 111th Cong. (2009); Personal Data 
Privacy and Security Act of 2007, S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007); Identity Theft Preven-
tion Act, S. 1178, 110th Cong. (2007); Data Security Act of 2007, S. 1260, 110th Cong. 
(2007), H.R. 1685, 110th Cong. (2007); Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 958, 
110th Cong. (2007), H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 107. Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data 
Protection: Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1074 
(2009). 
 108. See e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.404 (2019). 
 109. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (Sept. 29, 
2018) http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technol-
ogy/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [perma.cc/7B4V-USBR]. 
 110. Oregon’s data breach notification statute was first enacted in 2009, amended 
in 2015, and has received a subsequent amendment in 2018. Or. Rev. Stat. § 654A.600-
628 (2018); see Daniel J. Moses, Oregon Enacts Tougher Data Breach Notification 
Law, THE SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Apr. 25, 2018), 
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example, in 2006, Maine’s Bureau of Insurance was the first insurance regula-
tor to require insurance entities to notify the agency after suffering a data 
breach.111  Numerous other states have followed suit, including Connecticut in 
2010,112 Washington in 2013,113 and California in 2014.114  Tennessee’s 2016 
amendment to its data breach statute illustrates the potential downside of state 
regulation: ill-contrived policy or patent errors in legislation.115  Tennessee’s 
2016 amendment removed an exemption for personal information breaches 
traceable to employees, but it also removed Tennessee’s encryption safe harbor 





 111. Maine Insurance Regulation Bulletin No. 345 provides that those licensed by 
the Superintendent – insurers, producers, adjusters, and third-party administrators – are 
required to notify the Superintendent of breaches that require notice under the notice of 
Risk to Personal Data Act. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 10 §§ 1346–1349 (2005).  The notice 
should include a description of the breach; the number of Maine residences affected; a 
copy of the notice and other information sent to affected persons; a description of the 
curative steps taken; and the name and contact information for the person whom the 
Superintendent may contact. Id. 
 112. Pursuant to Bulletin IC-25, all licensees and registrants of the Connecticut In-
surance Department are required to notify the Department of any information security 
incident which affects any Connecticut residents as soon as the incident is identified, 
but no later than five calendar days after the incident is identified. Information Security 
Incidents, STATE OF CONN. INS. DEPT. BULLETIN IC-25 (2010). 
 113. As adopted under notice filed as WSR 13-07-053, all licensees must notify the 
insurance commissioner within two business days of such licensee determining that 
notification regarding a security breach of personal health or private information under 
RCW 19.255.010 and 45 C.F.R. 164 is required to be made to consumers or customers. 
Security Breach Notification, WASH. OFF. OF THE INS. COMM’R WSR 13–07–053 
(2013).  The notification to the insurance commissioner must be in writing and include 
the number of customers or consumers potentially affected and what actions are being 
taken. Id. 
 114. On May 16, 2014, the California Department of Insurance, Legal Division, 
issued a bulletin to all admitted insurers, insurance producers and other interested per-
sons informing them of California’s improper personal information disclosure and se-
curity breach notification requirements. Notification of Improper Personal Information 
Disclosures and Security Breaches, CAL. DEPT. OF INS. NOTICE (2014).  Per this bulle-
tin, the California Insurance Commissioner requests all insurers, insurance producers, 
and insurance support organizations to provide to the Insurance Commissioner any no-
tices or information submitted to the Attorney General’s Office in accordance with 
Civil Code § 1798.82(f). Id. 
 115. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47–18–2107 (2017); Thomas Ritter, Tennessee Amends Its 
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was encrypted.116  No other state had such a requirement.117  Encrypted infor-
mation is useless without an encryption key, so Tennessee’s modification es-
sentially imposed liability on entities despite a lack of potential harm to citi-
zens.  Tennessee’s attempt to update the law by removing the encryption safe 
harbor was “undoubtedly a noble (and nationally unprecedented) idea,” but in 
response to widespread criticism, the state quickly reinserted the safe harbor 
while “exhibiting an appropriate level of corrective action.”118  As illustrated 
by Tennessee, state action has the potential to result in poor policy decisions, 
but their response highlights states’ capacity to quickly make corrective 
measures in response to national criticisms.   
States have also pioneered regulations of private digital industry cyberse-
curity. “[T]he federal government’s cybersecurity regulation [remains] scat-
tered and weak,”119 and numerous states have moved to impose heightened cy-
bersecurity requirements on private entities.120  In 2018, thirty-five states in-
troduced “265 bills or resolutions related to cybersecurity.”121  Of those pro-
posals, twenty-two states passed fifty-two heightened requirements.122  Similar 
to the pioneering data breach notification regulations, “[s]tate approaches to 
cybersecurity regulation are providing the Federal government with models to 
consider as it crafts its own nation-wide laws.”123  One recent example includes 
South Carolina’s regulation of its insurance industry.124  The success or failure 
  
 116. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47–18–2107 (2017); see Ritter, supra note 115.  
 117. Ritter, supra note 115. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Jeff Kosseff, Hamiltonian Cybersecurity, 54 Wake Forrest L. Rev. 155, 174 
(2019).  “It may be surprising that an overarching federal cybersecurity law doesn’t yet 
exist in the United States.” Kayla Matthews, Getting Familiar with Cybersecurity 
Laws: Four Regulations You Should Know, GLOBAL SIGN GMO INTERNET GRP. (Jan. 
10, 2019), https://www.globalsign.com/en/blog/four-cybersecurity-regulations-you-
should-know/ [https://perma.cc/9TMF-A82L]. 
 120. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. § 704–1 (2018); 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00–
17.04 2 (2019); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 23 § 500.00 (2017).; 3 COLO. CODE 
REGS., 704–1: R. 51–4.8; 3 COLO. CODE REGS. 704–1: R. 51 – 4.14 (IA) (2019); 4–4 
CODE. VT. R. § 8: 8–4 (2019). 
 121. Cybersecurity Legislation 2018, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF ST. LEGIS. (Feb. 8, 
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technol-
ogy/cybersecurity-legislation-2018.aspx [perma.cc/3MP3-AY2M]. 
 122. Id.  
 123. How State Cybersecurity Regulations Drive Federal Action, CORANET (July 
10, 2018), https://www.coranet.com/state-cybersecurity-regulations/ 
[perma.cc/9QXT-P6XW].; Richard Hill, N.Y. Rule Could Be Model for Cyber-Col-
laboration, 108 BANKING REP. (BNA) 458 (Mar. 23, 2017) (discussing how New 
York’s regulations could model similar regulations across the nation); Sabrina 
Galli, NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulations: A Blueprint for Uniform State Statute?, 22 
N.C. BANKING INST. 235, 254 (2018) (“[T]he NYDFS regulation adds two more tech-
nical safeguards, encryption and multi-factor authentication, that do not currently exist 
within the FTC regulation.”). 
 124. Insurance Data Security Act, S.C CODE ANN. § 38–99–10–100 (2019). 
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of South Carolina’s pioneering effort, which itself contains a data breach noti-
fication requirement,125 will inform future national regulation of insurance in-
dustry data security.  New Hampshire recently followed South Carolina’s lead 
by enacting its own data security requirements for insurance entities.126 
Pioneering state efforts to regulate issues of privacy are particularly rele-
vant here.  California was the first regulator, at the federal or state level, to 
enact a statute requiring online services and websites to publish privacy poli-
cies.127  Delaware followed when it recently enacted a substantially similar re-
quirement, which was modeled after the California statute.128  State regulators 
led the charge in addressing issues of online sexual privacy, which went un-
addressed prior to the pioneering efforts of California in 2014 despite the rising 
privacy concerns and individual harm such practices cause.129  Vermont’s 2018 
regulation of data brokers exemplifies a proactive state regulation in the area 
of digital privacy.130  The data broker industry has long been criticized as an 
example of the federal government’s failure to address informational privacy 
concerns.131  Within the digital economy, data brokers function as upstream 
intermediaries132 that aggregate and sell the personal information of individuals 
throughout the country.133  The FTC investigated the informational privacy 
  
 125. § 38–99–40. 
 126. New Hampshire Senate Bill 194, LEGISCAN (Aug. 5, 2019) 
https://legiscan.com/NH/text/SB194/id/2037480 [perma.cc/34MM-ABRM]; Alysa 
Zetler Hutnik, Katie Townley & Lauren Myers, New Hampshire Enacts New Insurance 
Data Security Law, AD LAW SUCCESS (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.adlawaccess.com/2019/08/articles/new-hampshire-enacts-new-insur-
ance-data-security-law/ [perma.cc/E69C-TQMN]. 
 127. See Cal. Online Privacy Prot. Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22575 (2016). 
 128. Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 764 (2016); see Press Release, Internet Privacy and 
Safety Agenda Becomes Law with Governor’s Signature, OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN OF 
DEL. (Aug. 7, 2015), http://news.delaware.gov/2015/08/07/internet-privacy-and-
safety-agenda-becomes-law-with-governors-signature/ [perma.cc/2C2Y-ZSNW]. 
 129. See Citron, supra note 128, at 773–76; Danielle Keats Citron, Revenge Porn 
Should Be a Crime in U.S., CNN (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/opinion/citron-revenge-porn/ [perma.cc/CNJ2-
JGQW]. 
 130. See 9 VT. STAT. ANN. § 2447 (2019) (“Data broker duty to protect information; 
standards; technical requirements”). 
 131. Yael Grauer, What Are ‘DataBrokers,’ and Why Are They Scooping Up Infor-
mation About You?, VICE, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bjpx3w/what-are-data-
brokers-and-how-to-stop-my-private-data-collection(Mar. 27, 2018) [perma.cc/Z7YD-
ADA2]. 
 132. See Rob Frieden, Two-Sided Internet Markets and the Need to Assess Both 
Upstream and Downstream Impacts, 68 Am. U. L. REV. 713, 757–58 (2019). 
 133. In a 2015 investigation, federal regulators discovered that one single company 
had compiled “3000 data segments for nearly every U.S. consumer,” another company 
stockpiled consumer data covering “one trillion dollars in consumer transactions,” and 
yet another company added more than “three billion new records each month to its 
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threats data brokers posed throughout the 2000s.134  The FTC first identified 
the need for legislation regulating the practice in 2011135 and has reiterated that 
position numerous times.136  Congress, however, has repeatedly failed to enact 
targeted regulation.137  Vermont moved to address the regulatory vacuum in 
  
databases.” Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (May 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-bro-
kers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-
2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [perma.cc/JJM3-4DQ3]; see also Ashley Kuempel, 
Comment, The Invisible Middlemen: A Critique and Call for Reform of the Data Broker 
Industry, 36 NW. J. INT’L L & BUS. 207, 210 (2016); Laura Palk & Krishnamurty Mu-
ralidhar, A Free Ride: Data Brokers’ Rent-Seeking Behavior and the Future of Data 
Inequality, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 779 (2018); Rebecca Lipman, Online Privacy 
and the Invisible Market for Our Data, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 777 (2016). 
 134. See, e.g., What Information Do Data Brokers Have on Consumers, and How 
Do They Use It? Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. (Dec. 
18, 2013) (statement of Jessica Rich, Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_state-
ments/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commission-entitled-what-information-do-
data-brokers-have-consumers/131218databrokerstestimony.pdf [perma.cc/2CGC-
F3QN]; Identity Theft: Recent Developments Involving the Security of Sensitive Con-
sumer Information Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Aff., 109th Cong. 
(Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Deborah Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/050310idtheft.pdf [perma.cc/J7Q3-MYYJ]; The In-
formation Marketplace: Merging and Exchanging Consumer Data, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Mar. 13, 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/infomktplace/in-
dex.shtml [perma.cc/43EF-ZF74]; see also Press Release, Information Flows: The 
Costs and Benefits Related to the Collection 
and Use of Consumer Information, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 18, 2003), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2003/06/ information-flows-costs-and-
benefits-consumers-and-businesses [perma.cc/TZ3V-3R69]. 
 135. Legislative Hearing on H.R. 2221, the Data Accountability and Protection Act, 
and H.R. 1319, the Informed P2P User Act Before the H.R. Comm. on Energy & Com-
merce, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Eileen Harrington, Acting Director of the Bu-




 136. The Need for Privacy Protections: Perspectives from the Administration and 
the Federal Trade Commission Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 
112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/120509privacyprotections.pdf [perma.cc/FPF6-
27QE]; Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, supra note 133; 
BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES, supra 
note 18. 
 137. See Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act, S. 2025, 113th Cong. 
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2017138 and subsequently passed legislation in November of 2018,139 imple-
menting regulations in the following month.140  The Vermont legislation spec-
ifies conduct related to the use and collection of personal information that is 
explicitly prohibited, such as acquiring personal information by fraud and us-
ing personal information for the purposes of engaging in fraud, harassment, or 
discrimination.141  In addition, it requires “data brokers”142 to establish and 
maintain “a comprehensive information security program” and register annu-
ally with the Vermont Attorney General.143   
B. Synergistic Federalism: States Fill in Gaps of Existing Federal 
Regulations and Contribute to Ongoing Cooperative Efforts 
States have played an important legislative gap-filling role to bolster ex-
isting federal privacy regulations in the digital sphere.144  California, Texas, 
and Delaware have enacted legislation to strengthen federal privacy protections 
for children’s data, bolstering the sectorial federal framework of COPPA.145  
  
 138. T.J. Donovan, Vermont Att’y Gen., Data Brokers, OFF. OF THE VT. ATT’Y 
GEN. (Dec. 5, 2017), https://ago.vermont.gov/blog/2017/12/05/data-brokers/ 
[perma.cc/K3JN-8QSQ] (“On June 8, 2017, the Governor signed S.72 into law. Section 
2 of this bill mandates: On or before December 15, 2017, the Commissioner of Finan-
cial Regulation and the Attorney General, in consultation with industry and consumer 
stakeholders, shall submit [recommendations concerning data aggregator regula-
tions].”). 
 139. 9 Vt. Stat. Ann. §§ 2430, 2433, 2446 & 2447 (2018). 
 140. Guidance on Vermont’s Act 171 of 2018 Data Broker Regulation, OFF. OF THE 
VT. ATT’Y GEN., (December 11, 2018), https://www.sec.state.vt.us/me-
dia/914592/2018-12-11-vt-data-broker-regulation-guidance.pdf [perma.cc/BK6G-
YBHH]. 
 141. Id. at 11; 9 VT. STAT. ANN. § 2431 (2019).  
 142. 9 VT. STAT. ANN. § 2433(4)(A) (2019) (defining a data broker as any “busi-
ness, or unit or units of a business, separately or together, that knowingly collects and 
sells or licenses to third parties the brokered personal information of a consumer with 
whom the business does not have a direct relationship.”). 
 143. §§ 2446, 2447.  
 144. Bellia, supra note 7, at 882 (noting the “importance of federal leadership in 
information privacy problems, with the adoption of a federal statute creating the mo-
mentum for adoption of state law.”); see State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, NAT’L 
CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (Aug. 13, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunica-
tions-and-information-technology/state-laws-related-to-internet-privacy.aspx#ISPs 
[perma.cc/Q9JB-N37V]. 
 145. 6 DEL. CODE ANN. § 1204C (2016); CALIF. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22580–
22582; Citron, supra note 129, at 780; Children’s Apps Collected Personal Infor-
mation, FOX SAN ANTONIO NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015), http://foxsananto-
nio.com/news/tech/childrens-apps-collected-personal-information-11-06-2015 
[perma.cc/BTM6-JT3R] (discussing the Texas Attorney General’s cases against chil-
dren’s app developers and agreements not to collect location data). 
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Delaware has also enacted legislation extending information privacy protec-
tions to digital book services (“e-books”)146 similar to those federally estab-
lished over video viewership histories by the Video Privacy Protection Act.147  
More recently, New York promulgated a cybersecurity regulation for business 
entities operating within the financial industry, supplementing those provided 
by the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act.148  State ac-
tion may also occur in response to federal retrenchment of privacy protections.  
Two years after the Federal Communications Commission repealed the “net-
neutrality” regulation of Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) in 2016, twenty-
four states moved to enact legislation granting their citizens the ability to re-
strict ISPs’ collection and use of personal information.149  Nevada and Minne-
sota currently have such restrictions in place.150  
Perhaps nowhere is the cooperation between state and federal regulators 
more apparent than in the activity of state attorneys general.151  Inspired by the 
FTC,152 state attorneys general enjoy “a synergistic relationship with federal 
agencies working on privacy and data security issues.”153  State attorneys gen-
eral often collaborate together to address national privacy issues.154  In the past 
decade, a majority of state attorneys general have participated in “one or more 
multistate investigations spearheaded by privacy pioneers.”155  For example, in 
2012, thirty-nine state attorneys general participated in a unified action against 
Google to address digital privacy concerns.156  State attorneys general have also 
played an increasingly important role in experimenting with enacting novel 
legislative regulatory frameworks within their states and beyond.157 
  
 146. 6 DEL. CODE ANN. § 1206C (2016). 
 147. See, e.g., The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988. 18 U.S.C § 2710 (2018); 
Baker Hostetler, The Privacy Protection Act: Watching the Court Through Crossed 
Eyes, DATA PRIVACY MONITOR (Mar. 7, 2018) https://www.dataprivacymoni-
tor.com/information-governance-2/the-video-privacy-protection-act-watching-the-
courts-through-crossed-eyes/ [perma.cc/X3EK-NWMU]. 
 148. 23 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 500, et seq. (containing the cybersecurity 
regulations promulgated by the New York State Department of Financial Services in 
March 2017). 
 149. 2018 Privacy Legislation Related to Internet Service Providers, NAT’L CONF. 
OF ST. LEGIS. (May 13, 2019) http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-
information-technology/privacy-legislation-related-to-internet-service-providers-
2018.aspx [perma.cc/Z9N5-6HVW]. 
 150. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.498 (1999); MINN. STAT. §§ 325M.01–325M.09 
(2019). 
 151. See generally Citron, supra note 128, at 747. 
 152. Id. at 755.  
 153. Id. at 791.  
 154. Id. at 793 (illustrating the unified action thirty-nine state attorneys general of-
fices took against Google in 2012). 
 155. Id. at 758. 
 156. Id. at 793. 
 157. Id.  
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C.  Preemptive Federal Privacy Legislation: The Consequences of 
Limiting States’ Regulatory Capacity in the Digital Sphere 
In 2004, the federal government expressly preempted thirty-three state 
regulations targeting spam emailing.158  The Controlling the Assault of Non-
Solicited Pornography And Marketing Act of 2003 (“CAN-SPAM”) set a ceil-
ing for state regulations and preempted stricter state laws.159  The purpose of 
CAN-SPAM was to harmonize variations in existing state spam laws.160  How-
ever, the federal legislation excluded certain standards that were uniform across 
state laws and imposed much looser regulatory requirements.161  In addition, 
while most preceding state regulations created a private cause of action for in-
dividuals,162 the FTC was exclusively empowered with CAN-SPAM enforce-
ment.163  Because CAN-SPAM was enacted before the benefits and detriments 
of the various state law approaches became apparent, it ultimately hindered the 
effectiveness of national regulation in the area.164  The legislation has failed to 
achieve its intended purposes,165 and CAN-SPAM remains an important lesson 
that where “the federal law is weak and preempts the state law, we probably 
would be better off without it.”166 
States clearly have an important role in addressing the digital era’s finicky 
privacy issues, but all previous state privacy regulations are dwarfed by the 
scope of California’s Consumer Privacy Act of 2018.  Now, the issue is 
whether the nature of the CCPA is fundamentally different than preceding state 
privacy actions, and if so, whether it is so different as to warrant federal occu-
pation and potential preemption.  
  
 158. 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b) (2018); see 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(11) (2018). 
 159. § 7707(b). 
 160.  Rita Marie Cain, When Does Preemption Not Really Preempt? The Role of 
State Law After Can-Spam, 3 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 751, 758 (2008). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 760.   
 163. Id. at 759.   
 164. Id. (“Therefore, there was never any meaningful opportunity to see if these 
remedies actually could make a difference in combating the spam problem before they 
were preempted by federal law.”). 
 165. Daniel Nasaw, Federal Law Fails to Lessen Flow of Junk E-Mail, WALL ST. 
J. Aug. 10, 2004, at D2; see John Soma et al., Spam Still Pays: The Failure of the CAN-
SPAM Act of 2003 and Proposed Legal Solutions, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 165, 171–74 
(2008) (providing an overview of proposed non-legal solutions to the spam problem); 
David J. Rutenberg, Silence of the Spam: Improving the Can-Spam Act by Including an 
Expanded Private Cause of Action, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 225, 245 (2011) (The 
federal anti-spam law has proven to be very ineffective in preventing spam.); see also 
Tom Zeller, Jr., Law Barring Junk E-Mail Allows a Flood Instead, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 
2005); David McGuire, A Year After Legislation, Spam Still Widespread; Technology 
Seen as Best Deterrent, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2005, at E5. 
 166. Jordan M. Blanke, “Robust Notice” and “Informed Consent:” the Keys to 
Successful Spyware Legislation, 7 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2, 81 (2006). 
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V. CALIFORNIA’S CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT OF 2018 
The digital industry cannot remedy privacy concerns through competition 
alone,167 and in response to federal inaction, state-level regulators have played 
an important role in addressing privacy concerns to the benefit of their citizens 
and the nation as a whole.168  California enacted the CCPA within this con-
text.169  Alastair Mactaggart, the CCPA’s primary backer,170 drafted the CCPA 
with the intent to “slowly dry up the supply of personal information that com-
panies could buy or trade on the open market” by forcing companies into com-
pliance.171  Mactaggart struggled during his initial campaign in January 2018172 
and faced strong opposition from Silicon Valley business interests.173  The 
struggle ended months later, in March of 2018, when Facebook’s Cambridge 
Analytica Scandal broke, catalyzing support for Mactaggart’s bill.  Following 
the largest privacy scandal in history,174 “all [CCPA campaigners] had to say 
was data privacy” to receive support from concerned Californians.175  The 
CCPA’s expansive scope and provisions codifying tenets of information pri-
vacy control are novel to the landscape of United States privacy regulation. 
  
 167. Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1009, 
1010 (2013); Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1697 (“As the industry is currently config-
ured, it benefits from standards that accomplish the following: promote maximum dis-
closure of personal data; establish a poor level of transparency; offer no effective pro-
cedural or substantive rights; and establish hollow oversight.”). 
 168. See John A. Rothchild, Against Notice and Choice: The Manifest Failure of 
the Proceduralist Paradigm to Protect Privacy Online (or Anywhere Else), 66 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 559 (2018). 
 169. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.196 (2018). 
 170. Ben Alder, California Passes Strict Internet Privacy Law With Implications 
For The Country, NPR (June 29, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624336039/california-passes-strict-internet-privacy-
law-with-implications-for-the-country [perma.cc/ZTN9-RHE6]. 
 171. Nicholas Confessore, The Unlikely Activists Who Took On Silicon Valley — 
and Won, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 14, 2018) https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/08/14/magazine/facebook-google-privacy-data.html 
[perma.cc/QJW7-DB9X]. 
 172. Consumer Data Privacy: Examining the European Union’s General Data Pro-
tection Regulation and the California Consumer Privacy Act, Hearing before the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 115th Cong. 8 at 2 
(2018) (statement of Alastair Mactaggart, Chair, Californians for Consumer Privacy). 
 173. Confessore, supra note 171. 
 174. Christopher Wylie, Cambridge Analytica a Year on: ‘A Lesson in Institutional 
Failure’, THE GUARDIAN (March 17, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2019/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-year-on-lesson-in-institutional-failure-chris-
topher-wylie [perma.cc/MB8K-EA8J]. The Cambridge Analytica Scandal represents a 
turning point in global perspectives on digital privacy. The scale of the incident, the 
public’s reception, the widespread medical coverage, and the secrecy of the widespread 
practices at issue were unprecedented. Id.  
 175. Confessore, supra note 169. 
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A.  CCPA’s Informational Privacy Protections. 
The CCPA overhauls the FTC’s passive digital privacy regulation,176 and 
it operationalizes the individual-centered “privacy-control” theories of Alan 
Westin’s definition of informational privacy.177  The CCPA empowers Califor-
nians with control over the collection and use of their data,178 including: (1) the 
right to know what personal information is being collected about them;179 (2) 
the right to delete any personal information collected by an entity;180 (3) the 
right to know whether their personal information is sold or disclosed and to 
whom, and to opt-out of future sales;181 (4) the right to access their personal 
information; and (5) the right to nondiscriminatory pricing for services and 
products while exercising their right to opt-out of data collection.182  
The CCPA represents an unprecedented development in United States 
privacy law.  It sweepingly, and in no terms precisely, establishes a framework 
to bolster individual privacy in the modern information economy.183  Much of 
the CCPA’s expansive scope is due to its broad definitions of the personal in-
formation and the entities and practices it subjects to compliance.  
  
 176. “Notice-and-choice is a procedural rule in that, as long as it follows the pre-
scribed procedures, tendering notice and obtaining consent, a data processor may col-
lect any private information and use it for any purpose. A substantive privacy rule, on 
the other hand, deems certain conduct impermissible even with notice and consent.” 
Rothchild, supra note 166, at 564 (suggesting the substantive right that a “company 
should be forbidden to condition provision of a good or service to a consumer on the 
consumer’s consent to collection or use of private information that is not required for 
provision of the good or service.”); see Assemb. B. 375, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. § 2(i)–(5) 
(Cal. 2017) (enumerating rights). 
 177. See Westin, supra note 14; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(7)(g) (2018) (“‘Con-
sumer’ means a natural person who is a California resident”); see also Cal. Civ. Code 
§ 1798(2)(a) (2018). 
 178. See Assemb. B. No. 375, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. § 2(h) (Cal. 2017). 
 179. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.110(a), (b) (2018). 
 180. § 1798.105(a) (“consumer shall have the right to request that a business delete 
any personal information about the consumer which the business has collected from the 
consumer.”); § 1798.105(b) (“Consumer rights regarding deletion of personal infor-
mation collected by businesses; disclosure; deletion requests; exceptions.”). 
 181. § 1798.120(a) (“A consumer shall have the right, at any time, to direct a busi-
ness that sells personal information about the consumer to third parties not to sell the 
consumer's personal information.”). 
 182. § 1798.125(a)(1). 
 183. Chris Achatz, California Consumer Privacy Act: What You Need to Know, KO 
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The CCPA’s definition of personal information is broad and non-exclu-
sive.184  “[O]ne would be hard-pressed to conceive of any data that is not” in-
cluded in the CCPA.185  The types of information the CCPA covers “includes, 
but is not limited to” the following: physical characteristics or descriptions, 
“audio, electronic, visual, thermal, olfactory, or similar information,” aliases, 
account names, postal addresses, purchasing histories, internet activity infor-
mation, geolocation data, and “[i]nferences drawn [from these types of infor-
mation] to create a profile about a consumer reflecting the consumer's prefer-
ences, characteristics, psychological trends, predispositions, behavior, atti-
tudes, intelligence, abilities, and aptitudes.”186  Information is only subject to 
the CCPA if it “identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated 
with, or could be reasonably linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular 
consumer or household[.]”187  However, it exempts “publicly available infor-
mation that is lawfully made available to the general public from federal, state, 
or local government records.”188  At the cost of more confusion, it is sufficient 
to state that the CCPA “applies to a much broader data set than GDPR189 or 
any United States privacy law to date,”190 and for covered businesses, mere 
“GDPR prep is not going to be sufficient.”191  
  
 184. § 1798.140 (incorporating personal information defined in CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1798.80 (2010)). 
 185. Michael Hahn & Matthew Savare, The California Consumer Privacy Act’s 
Radical Impact on the Digital Ad Ecosystem, BLOOMBERG NEWS AUTHORITY: INSIGHTS 
(Aug. 9, 2018), [perma.cc/EJA3-ZVVS]. 
 186. This is a non-exclusive list of the CCPA’s non-exclusive definition of “per-
sonal information.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1)(B) (2018) (incorporating per-
sonal information defined in CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.80 (2018)). 
 187. § 1798.140(o)(1). 
 188. § 1798.140 (o)(2). 
 189. The General Data Protection Regulation, or GDPR, is the European Union’s 
most recent omnibus personal digital privacy regulation which was enacted in 2016 and 
became effective in 2018. Council Directive 9398/15 of June 11, 2015, Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individ-
uals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9565-2015-INIT/en/pdf 
[perma.cc/TYF9-J7YY]. 
 190. Sweeping New Compliance Obligations: The CCPA’s Impact on Financial 
Services, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.privsec-
blog.com/2019/01/articles/california-consumer-protection-act-ccpa/sweeping-new-
compliance-obligations-the-ccpas-impact-on-financial-services/ [perma.cc/52VX-
5E66] (“For most consumer-focused industries, the CCPA will be a game-changer – 
imposing costly compliance burdens, and creating significant enforcement and litiga-
tion risks.”). 
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The range of business entities facing CCPA compliance are similarly ex-
pansive.  The CCPA defines a “covered entity” as any business “that collects 
consumers’ personal information, or on the behalf of which such information 
is collected and that alone, or jointly with others, determines the purposes and 
means of the processing of consumers’ personal information, that does busi-
ness in the State of California.”192  The CCPA also applies to any entity “that 
controls or is controlled by a [covered] business . . . and that shares common 
branding with [that] business.”193  In an attempt to limit third-party data trad-
ing, i.e. the data broker industry or simply trading consumer information be-
tween corporations or subsidiaries, the CCPA specifies that “collects” is de-
fined as “buying, renting, gathering, obtaining, receiving, or accessing any per-
sonal information pertaining to a consumer by any means,” which “includes 
receiving information from the consumer, either actively or passively, or by 
observing the consumer’s behavior.”194   
Some commentators predict the CCPA will demand compliance from 
“more than 500,000 U.S. companies . . . in virtually every sector.”195  Depend-
ing on an entity’s activities, “a website might only need 137 unique visitors 
from California per day” to be subject to CCPA enforcement.196  Many large 
out-of-state businesses will be subject to compliance for simply having a web-
site,197 causing many internet-accessible businesses to unintentionally subject 
themselves to enforcement actions in California.  Though its current iteration 
is subject to change,198 the CCPA grants the California Attorney General’s of-
  
 192. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(1) (2018). 
 193. § 1798.140(c)(2) (“Control or controlled” means “ownership of, or the power 
to vote, more than 50 percent of the outstanding shares of any class of voting security 
of a business; control in any manner over the election of a majority of the directors, or 
of individuals exercising similar functions; or the power to exercise a controlling influ-
ence over the management of a company. ‘Common branding’ means a shared name, 
servicemark, or trademark.”). 
 194. § 1798.140(e). 
 195. Hahn & Savare, supra note 185. 
 196. Timothy Tobin et al., California Consumer Privacy Act: The Challenge Ahead 
– The Impact of the CCPA on Data-Driven Marketing and Business Models, HOGAN 




 197. Out-of-state businesses who “do business in the State of California” and either 
have (a) annual gross revenues in excess of twenty-five million dollars, (b) the personal 
information of 50,000 or more California citizens, or (c) derives 50% or more of its 
annual revenues from selling consumers’ personal information. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1798.140(c)(1)(A)–(C) https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billCompareCli-
ent.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB375 [perma.cc/WAJ5-VT9L]. 
 198. This is subject to change by recently proposed amendments. See S.B. 561 Leg., 
2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
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fice the exclusive enforcement of those rights by imposing $100 to $1000 pen-
alties for each individual violation.199  Most importantly, the CCPA’s final ver-
sion will likely allow a private right of action for qualified offenses.200  
Official clarification of the CCPA remains forthcoming.201  To date, Cal-
ifornia regulators have refused to answer public concerns over the CCPA’s un-
certainty with any specificity.202  The California Attorney General’s Office has 
made some optimistic assurances that the CCPA’s details will be fleshed out 
when it publishes its proposed regulations “in Fall of 2019.”203  Those pro-
posals were published on October 10, 2019, yet “it remains unclear how Cali-
fornia’s Attorney General will interpret and enforce key CCPA provisions.”204 
That uncertainly has further complicated the task of CCPA compliance, which 
already demanded “significant preparation in advance of the effective date of 
January 1, 2020.”205  For comparison, businesses facing compliance with the 
GDPR were given two years to prepare for its requirements,206 and even then, 
  
 199. Id. 
 200. Id.  
 201. See Alysa Z. Hutnik & Lauren Myers, California Privacy Update: What We 
Heard at Friday’s CCPA Hearing, AD L. ACCESS (Jan. 28, 2019) 
https://www.adlawaccess.com/2019/01/articles/california-privacy-update-what-we-
heard-at-fridays-ccpa-hearing/ [perma.cc/JX6F-4RSC] (“For businesses hoping for 
CCPA clarity and guidance soon, that seems unlikely. California Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Lisa Kim initiated the hearing, emphasizing that the Attorney General’s Office was 
in the beginning of its rulemaking process and noting that she anticipated the formal 
review process not to start until Fall 2019.”). 
 202. See California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA): Current Rulemaking Activity, 
OFF. OF THE CAL. ATT’Y GEN. (2019), https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa 
[perma.cc/6ZA5-GNZB]. 
 203. See California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA): Today’s Forum, OFF. OF THE 
CAL. ATT’Y GEN. (2019), https://www.oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/pri-
vacy/ccpa-public-forum-ppt.pdf? [perma.cc/55LU-NU3U]; Lauren Valenzuela & June 
Coleman, California’s Fifth Consumer Privacy Act Forum in Review, INSIDEARM 
(Feb. 12, 2019),  https://www.insidearm.com/news/00044735-californias-fifth-con-
sumer-privacy-act-pu/ [perma.cc/B7QF-5B59]. 
 204.  Ashley S. Shively, Mark S. Melodia, Marissa C. Serafino, California Attorney 
General Releases Draft Regulations on the California Consumer Privacy Act, 
HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publica-
tions/2019/10/california-attorney-general-releases-draft-regulations [perma.cc/GYZ4-
UFUV] 
 205. Theodore P. Augustinos and Laura L. Ferguson, CCPA Guide: Are You Cov-




 206. Matt Burgess, What is GDPR?: The Summary Guide to GDPR Compliance in 
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many businesses remained unprepared just weeks before it became effective.207  
Businesses facing CCPA compliance have an easier task and will benefit from 
the growing compliance-related service market,208 but the effectiveness of 
compliance consultants will be limited by the lack of certainty and formal guid-
ance.209 
The latest proposed amendments to the CCPA are likely to add to the 
mounting skepticism surrounding the bill.210  The pending California Senate 
Bill 561 (“SB 561”) amendment would remove the California Attorney Gen-
eral’s mandatory duty to respond to entities’ compliance guidance requests, 
expand the CCPA’s private cause of action,  and remove the thirty-day immun-
ity window entities have to cure alleged violations before facing enforce-
ment.211  SB 561 intends to alleviate the “unworkable obligations” placed on 
California’s Attorney General212 but risks aggravating the growing criticisms 
and uncertainties surrounding its effective date.213  Critics state the CCPA is 
“internally inconsistent and full of ambiguities,214 and rather than alleviating 
  
 207. Tiffany Robertson, Study Finds Organizations are not Ready for GDPR Com-
pliance Issues, THOMPSON REUTERS INSIGHTS (Aug. 15, 2017), https://blogs.thomson-
reuters.com/financial-risk/riskmanagement-compliance/study-finds-organizations-not-
ready-gdpr-compliance-issues/ [perma.cc/N8M2-3WEG]. 
 208. Mark Adams & David Kruger, Global Data Compliance in 2019, BPA 
SOLUTIONS (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.bpa-solutions.net/blog/2019-data-compli-
ance/ [perma.cc/XK2S-ME5R]. 
 209. Letter from Eric Goldman, Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law, 
et al., to California State Legislature, Dear Senators and Assembly Members (Jan. 17, 
2019) https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2886&con-
text=historical [perma.cc/USX2-8LL5 ] (expressing concerns about the CCPA and the 
“urgent need for major changes.”). 
 210. See Don Jergler, California Bills Would Add More Punch to Consumer Data 
Protection Law, INS. J. (mar. 6, 2019), https://www.insurancejour-
nal.com/news/west/2019/03/06/519826.htm [perma.cc/F8UZ-NRZP]. 
 211. See S.B. 561, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 212. Letter from Xavier Becerra, Attorney Gen. of Cal., to State Assembly Member 
Ed Chau and State Senator Robert M. Hertzberg (Aug. 22, 2018), https://digitalcom-
mons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2801&context=historical 
[perma.cc/68MD-22KP]; Cheryl Miller, Becerra Rips Lawmakers for ‘Unworkable’ 
Provision in New Data Privacy Law, THE RECORDER (Aug. 29, 
2018), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2018/08/29/becerra-rips-lawmakers-for-un-
workable-provisions-in-new-data-privacy-law/ [perma.cc/B7LJ-FY7D]. 
 213. See Joseph J. Lazzarotti et al., California AG Announces Amendment to the 
CCPA, THE NAT’L L. (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/califor-
nia-ag-announces-amendment-to-ccpa [perma.cc/Y2U2-HK4H]. 
 214. See Alan L. Friel & Taylor A. Bloom, CCPA Expansion Proposed, 
BAKERHOSTETLER DATA PRIVACY MONITOR (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.datapriva-
cymonitor.com/ccpa/ccpa-expansion-proposed/ [perma.cc/4JUZ-J3GF] (“This is 
alarming as there are detailed obligations for achieving compliance under CCPA, and 
the act is internally inconsistent and full of ambiguities.  Under SB 561, a well-meaning 
business that accidentally makes a mistake because it couldn’t seek clarification from 
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those fears, SB 561 embodies the ad-hoc nature of the CCPA’s grass-roots or-
igins.215  
The consequences of the CCPA’s unprecedented scope, formidable en-
forcement via a private right of action, and uncertain compliance requirements 
make preemption by federal lawmakers a tempting alternative.  At a glance, a 
new federal framework that balances privacy concerns with feasible industry 
practices may be a preferable compromise between the CCPA and the FTC’s 
current federal regulation under Section 5, but as previously discussed, states 
play an important if not essential role in the area of informational privacy reg-
ulation.  Addressing digital-era privacy in the United States is more nuanced 
than first impressions.  
VI.  STATE LABORATORY OR QUASI-FEDERAL ACTOR: ANALYZING 
THE FEDERALIST IMPLICATIONS OF CALIFORNIA’S CONSUMER 
PRIVACY ACT OF 2018 
Digital industry representatives and advocacy groups strongly oppose the 
CCPA and continue to fight for its alteration.216  Those interests have taken to 
Washington D.C., touting the need for greater consumer privacy protections 
while seeking to influence legislation at the federal level.217  While those efforts 
are unsurprising,218 they raise concerns given the costs of preempting states 
from regulating privacy in the digital sphere.219  
  
the AG will no longer have a 30-day opportunity to resolve the issue before enforce-
ment ensues.  Further, unlike the AG that exercises prosecutorial discretion to direct 
limited resources toward bad actors, allowing private attorney general actions will sub-
ject businesses to ‘gotcha’ claims for even innocent technical violations.  As a result, 
minor issues best handled by ‘fix it’ tickets could be met with expensive and socially 
inefficient class action lawsuits.”). 
 215. See Confessore, supra note 171.  
 216. See e.g., Issie Lapowsky, The Fight Over California’s Privacy Bill Has Only 
Just Begun, WIRED (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/california-privacy-
bill-tech-lobbying/ [perma.cc/L6XA-LFQQ]. 
 217. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 373–74 (1997); 
Robert A. Mikos, Making Preemption Less Palatable: State Poison Pill Legislation, 85 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 14 (2017) (“Furthermore, the states commonly must compete 
with relatively powerful lobbying groups that favor preemption, including business and 
trade associations.”). 
 218. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 941 (“At any rate, state legislative activities will 
continue and will drive a flight by businesses to Washington for federal solutions. Over 
the next decade and beyond, continuing waves of state privacy lawmaking will provoke 
industry activity to seek federal legislation.”).  
 219. See infra Section IV.C.  
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The CCPA becomes effective in 2020,220 and its impending effective date 
presents an ultimatum for Congress.221  Federal legislators can either: (1) enact 
an express legislative mandate for the federal regulation of the digital indus-
try’s collection and use of personal information, potentially preempting future 
state attempts to regulate in the area, or (2) allow the CCPA to move forward 
and ignore the national consequences of California’s actions.  The present dis-
cussion has focused on the benefits of state-level activity in privacy regula-
tions, so the remaining discussion is limited to the costs of federal “ceiling” 
preemption in the area, i.e., federal legislation would limit the ability of state 
regulators to experiment, pioneer, or police compliance with new or old ap-
proaches.222  Recent congressional proposals have contained such a limitation, 
and previous federal regulations in the digital sphere have imposed ceilings on 
state enforcement capabilities.223  The CCPA’s enforcement via a private cause 
of action make this type of limitation more likely in any future federal action,224  
either by express congressional mandate225 or subsequent agency decisions un-
der the mandate.226  
  
 220. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.198(a) (effective January 1, 2020). 
 221. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1746 
(2005); Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal 
Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 82–83 (2014) (“States are sites where . . . dissenters 
can model policymaking alternatives to the dominant national view.”); Friedman, supra 
note 214, at 403 (noting state legislative initiatives can “serve as an independent means 
of calling forth the voice of the people”). 
 222. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1548 (2007). 
 223. See Cain, supra note 160, at 770 (“Congress should reinstate all the private 
rights of action under state laws that were preempted by CAN-SPAM. Individual re-
cipients could then pursue statutory damages from any sender of spam who ignores opt-
out messages, not just senders whose messages violate the deception prohibitions. Al-
ternatively, Congress should create a meaningful private cause of action for recipients 
in a revised CAN-SPAM Act.”). 
 224. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 944 (“The problem with a monopoly on enforce-
ment given to federal agencies is that it would assign these organizations too large a 
role in the regulatory dialogue.”). 
 225. See Cain, supra note 160, at 757–58 (describing how the federal CAN-SPAM 
Act directly preempted state laws providing enforcement via individual causes of ac-
tion). 
 226. Mikos, supra note 217, at 16 (describing the common power of federal agen-
cies to “preempt state law anytime it conflicts with a congressional statute or an agency 
regulation, regardless of the damage done to state interests”). 
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A.  The National Costs of the CCPA 
The CCPA definitively rejects Congress’ practice of using “narrowly tar-
geted laws and regulations that prevent the privacy abuse of new technolo-
gies.”227  California’s law applies a new approach: trading durability for flexi-
bility while emphasizing that privacy concerns are important, complex, ab-
stract, subjective, and subject to change over time; that the fast-paced nature of 
the digital industry results in a continuous emergence of new privacy threats; 
and that static  regulations are often outpaced by industry developments.228  “It 
is difficult, after all, if not impossible, to predict the pace of technology inno-
vation and how it will affect society.”229  California’s legislature has eliminated 
the need to predict the future with the broad and generalized provisions of the 
CCPA.230  Those same provisions impose costs for entities subject to CCPA 
compliance, and national entities will pass those costs on to consumers.231  
Calling the CCPA a “state-level” regulation is a form of fiction: the Cal-
ifornia statute will impose national costs.232  The CCPA purports to regulate 
entities conducting any level of activity within California, so long the business 
meets the minimum annual revenue requirements and its activities in the state 
generate some revenue.233  It also claims to “regulate businesses with no nexus 
  
 227. Daniel Castro & Alan Mcquinn, The Privacy Panic Cycle: A Guide to Public 
Fears About New Technologies, INFO. TECH. AND INNOVATION FOUND. (Sept. 2015), 
http://www2.itif.org/2015-privacy-panic.pdf [perma.cc/88L3-BZDW]. 
 228. See, e.g., Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012). 
 229. Castro & Mcquinn, supra note 227. 
 230. Id.  
 231. Letter from Eric Goldman to California Legislature, California Consumer Pri-
vacy Act, (Jan. 17, 2019) https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti-
cle=2886&context=historical [perma.cc/USX2-8LL5 ] (“[The CCPA] causes tremen-
dous uncertainty and possibly wasted expenditures for businesses without real ties to 
California.”). 
 232. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 7, at 895 (discussing California’s heightened child 
data protection in 2004).   
 
Any website seeking to serve a national market will meet the general require-
ments of the California standard.  The standard becomes a national, though not 
a federally adopted, standard, and it may create externalities even if no other 
state adopts a conflicting rule. The effect of California's regulation – if not the 
very goal – is to raise the website’s costs.  Customers nationwide bear these 
costs, regardless of whether non-California residents value privacy at the same 
level as California residents do.  
 
Id.  It should be noted, however, that most forms of state regulation have consequences 
outside of state boarders to some extent. See Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 218, at 
80. 
 233. Goldman, supra note 231 (expressing concerns about the CCPA and the “ur-
gent need for major changes.”) 
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with California other than being affiliates.”234  The CCPA undoubtedly causes 
“uncertainty and possibly wasted expenditures for businesses without real ties 
to California.”235  
State regulations are not per se unjustified simply because they impose 
extra-territorial costs. The magnitude of the regulation’s costs and benefits 
must be considered along with the location where those consequences are felt. 
The costs imposed by a state-level privacy regulation will increase with the 
volume of activity regulated.  That is to say, the most burdensome scenario 
occurs when large states impose broad regulations.  The inverse holds that sec-
torial state-level privacy regulations that are less burdensome for the national 
industry may be justifiable despite extra-territorial costs.  Illinois’ regulation 
of biometric information illustrates a state-level privacy regulation that is per-
missible despite such national costs.  The market for biometric technology, 
while growing, occupies only a small portion of the digital-technology indus-
try.236  Following its emergence less than a decade ago, biometric technologies 
elicited strong reactions from the public due to their potential surveillance ap-
plications.237  Within that context, Illinois enacted the Biometric Information 
  
For example, the $25M threshold equally applies to businesses that receive all 
revenues from California residents and businesses that receive only $1 of reve-
nue from California residents. If so, a business without any ties to California 
must comply with the CCPA (at substantial expense) the moment it accepts a 
single dollar from a California resident. 
 
Id.; see also Stephen J. Astringer, The Endless Bummer: California’s Latest Attempt to 
Protect Children Online Is Far Out(Side) Effective, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 271, 288 (2015) (discussing California’s previous child privacy legisla-
tion). 
 234. Goldman, supra note 231. 
 235. Id.  
 236. One source predicts the entire U.S. biometric technology market will reach 
14.7 dollars in 2024, up from 2.3 billion in 2013. Arne Holst, Size of the Biometrick 
Market in the United States from 2013 to 2024 (in Billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA (Feb. 
21, 2018) https://www.statista.com/statistics/761249/biometrics-market-size-in-us/ 
[perma.cc/5SXK-V7AB].  In contrast, the total value of U.S. big data industry was 19.6 
billion dollars in 2013. Shanhong Liu, Forecast of Big Data Market Size, Based on 
Revenue, from 2011 to 2027 (in Billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA (Aug. 9, 2019) 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/254266/global-big-data-market-forecast/ 
[perma.cc/FL44-V2LF]. 
 237. Rachel L. German & K. Suzanne Barber, Current Biometric Adoption and 
Trends, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN CTR. FOR IDENTITY (Sept. 2017) https://iden-
tity.utexas.edu/assets/uploads/publications/Current-Biometric-Adoption-and-
Trends.pdf [perma.cc/6J67-72JL].  Even with the downturn in general public concern, 
privacy fundamentalists from advocacy groups like the Electronic Privacy Information 
Center continue to warn against the “profound threats to privacy and financial security” 
posed by biometric data use and non-regulation. Claire Gartland, Biometrics Are a 
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Protection Act in 2008 (“BIPA”),238 which heightened the state’s regulation of 
biometric information by granting Illinois citizens privacy protections.239  Few 
states have followed since then, and none of those provide a private right-of-
action like Illinois’ BIPA.240  
The localized-consequences of BIPA illustrate why state-level privacy 
regulations are workable when limited in scope.  BIPA is the strictest state-
level regulation of biometric data, but rather than establish a new national 
standard, companies can chose to: (1) ensure compliance by foregoing use of 
potentially beneficial biometric technologies; (2) attempt compliance while us-
ing such technologies by altering their practice and risking potential liability; 
or (3) evade the forum entirely.241  Like the CCPA, national companies that 
continue to subject themselves to BIPA liability “pass along the costs to con-
sumers.”242  However, the magnitude of the activity regulated by BIPA is min-
imal due to its sectorial nature and limited territorial scope, and much of its 
costs are suffered within the state243 by restricting its citizens’ access to such 
  
Grave Threat to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/room-
fordebate/2016/07/05/biometrics-and-banking/biometrics-are-a-grave-threat-to-pri-
vacy [perma.cc/A5Y7-W5HK ]. 
 238. Biometric Privacy Litigation: The Next Class Action Battleground, WINSTON 
& STRAWN LLP (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.winston.com/en/thought-leadership/bio-
metric-privacy-litigation-the-next-class-action-battleground-1.html [perma.cc/9DL4-
FQZW]. 
 239. See Biometric Info. Privacy Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 15(b)(1) (2008). 
 240. Illinois and Texas have active legislation heightening regulations for biometric 
data.  Biometric Information Protection Act (BIPA), 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/1-
99 (2018); Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act (CUBI), TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
ANN. § 503.001 (2017).  Four other states have pending biometric data legislation.  H.B. 
72, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2017); H.B. 5522, 2017 Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Conn. 2017); H.B. 523, 2017 Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2017); H.B. 1493, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Wash. 2017). 
 241. See, e.g., Jack Nicas, Why Google’s New App Won’t Match Your Face to Art 
in Some States, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-google-
wont-search-for-art-look-alike-in-some-states-1516194001 [https://perma.cc/4J7Q-
QBTN]; Erin Marine, Biometric Privacy Laws: Illinois and the Fight Against Intrusive 
Tech, FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://news.law.ford-
ham.edu/jcfl/2018/03/20/biometric-privacy-laws-illinois-and-the-fight-against-intru-
sive-tech/ [perma.cc/Z5U7-ZMKT]; Glosson, supra note 7, at 431 (“Several com-
mentators suggest that modern geolocation capabilities lower the burden that state laws 
place on interstate commerce by enabling them to block citizens of states in which they 
do not wish to do business . . . .”). 




 243. Amy Korte, The Flood of Biometric Privacy Litigation Engulfing Tech Com-
panies and Employers Should Make the General Assembly Think Twice Before Passing 
New Regulations that Could Increase Costs and Compliance Burdens for Companies, 
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technologies,244 “making [it] a less attractive place for business investment and 
hurting [its] ongoing ability to attract and keep a tech workforce.”245  BIPA 
does impose extraterritorial costs: states other than Illinois would benefit from 
a completely unregulated biometric technology market.246  However, the costs 
BIPA imposes on national innovation in the area are negligible, as ample alter-
native state forums are available for regulated entities to development regulated 
products and market such goods and services.  State privacy regulations that 
are limited in scope like BIPA are largely justified because the costs and ben-
efits of these experiments “hit home.”247  
None of the characteristics limiting the national consequences of BIPA 
are shared by the CCPA.  While BIPA narrowly targets biometric infor-
mation,248 the CCPA broadly applies to most types of personal information.249 
In addition, though Illinois has a large economy, the comparative economic 
might of California makes avoiding the regulated activity extremely costly for 
national entities with internet platforms.250  National companies that use fin-
gerprint security scanners may forgo using them in their Illinois offices, but the 
same company with a website and $25,000,000 of annual revenue would be hit 
hard by avoiding all business operations within California.  “At bottom, data 
privacy laws affect far more commerce than any obscenity statute or car deal-
ership regulation ever has because privacy laws impact businesses of all shapes 
and sizes.”251  The cumulative and indirect effects of those costs are passed on 
to consumers throughout the nation, and they are not negligible.252  Modern 
  
ILL. POL’Y (Oct. 27, 2017) https://www.illinoispolicy.org/while-illinois-courts-ama-
zon-privacy-litigation-threatens-tech-firms-illinois-employers/ [perma.cc/8SJL-
B4LN]. 
 244. Nicas, supra note 241. 
 245. Maisch, supra note 242. 
 246. See ABI Research Predicts Fingerprint Sensors, Facial Recognition, and Bio-
metric Surveillance to Propel the Global Biometrics Industry to $30 Billion by 2021, 
ABI RES. (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.abiresearch.com/press/abi-research-predicts-
fingerprint-sensors-facial-r/ [perma.cc/W3SF-H4Y9] (“[T]he global biometrics mar-
ket will reach more than $30 billion by 2021, marking an impressive 118% increase 
from 2015.”). 
 247. Greve, supra note 99.    
 248. Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2018). 
 249. Goldman, supra note 231 (“Most US privacy laws are ‘sectoral-based,’ i.e., 
they are optimized for the needs of specific industries.  In contrast, the CCPA applies 
across all industries, with only limited exceptions.  Because of the CCPA’s rushed ap-
proval process, the California legislature did not hear from thousands of different in-
dustries affected by the CCPA.”). 
 250. Hogan Lovells, California Continues to Shape Privacy and Data Security 
Standards, International Association of Privacy Professionals Privacy Tracker, IAPP 
(Oct. 1, 2013), https://iapp.org/news/a/california-continues-to-shape-privacy-and-data-
security-standards/ [perma.cc/ZJ9H-TWEM]. 
 251. Glosson, supra note 7, at 433. 
 252. Id. at 431, 433. 
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interstate commerce is tied to digital technologies.  The digital industry has 
proven its ability to yield paradigm-shifting benefits through innovation and 
entrepreneurship, and nearly all non-digital entities retain some form of digital 
platform in its operations.  
Federal preemption may be justified “to displace a law that has national 
consequences but that has not been subject to the national political process.”253  
The national costs of the CCPA pose serious concerns and presently favor such 
intervention.  Further, the case for judicial invalidation of the CCPA under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, a higher and more concrete burden than the pre-
sent policy conjecture, is plausible given the CCPA’s extraterritorial effects.254  
By purporting to regulate activity wholly outside of California’s borders, the 
CCPA “raises substantial Constitutional concerns.”255  Constitutionality aside, 
the recent actions of other states may lessen concerns raised by the CCPA’s 
national costs.  
B.  States are Following the CCPA’s Lead 
Numerous states have begun following California’s lead, alleviating some 
of the concerns that the CCPA will overburden non-Californians.  As we have 
seen in previous areas of digital industry regulation, like data breach notifica-
tion statutes, widespread state adoption and occupation of a regulatory field 
can negate concerns regarding the national costs imposed by a state pioneering 
the area.  This is true despite the risk that the strictest state approach may im-
pose “de facto national requirements.”256  In such situations, however, signifi-
cant inconsistencies between state requirements also support federal action to 
occupy and potentially preempt state regulations.257  
Ten states have already proposed CCPA-like legislation that would 
broadly regulate the collection and use of personal information.258  Missis-
  
 253. Bellia, supra note 7, at 899. 
 254. See Glosson, supra note 7, at 409 (approaching the issue with constitutional 
analysis under the Dormant Commerce Clause). 
 255. See Eric Goldman, 41 California Privacy Experts Urge Major Changes to the 
California Consumer Privacy Act, TECH. & MARKETING LAW BLOG (Sept. 21, 2019), 
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/01/41-california-privacy-experts-urge-ma-
jor-changes-to-the-california-consumer-privacy-act.htm [perma.cc/K45A-5XS5]. 
 256. Kosseff, supra note 119, at 181–82. 
 257. Bellia, supra note 7, at 894. 
 258. Rachel Marmor et al., “Copycat CCPA” Bills Introduced in States Across 
Country, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Sept, 21, 2019), https://www.privsec-
blog.com/2019/02/articles/california-consumer-protection-act-ccpa/copycat-ccpa-
bills-introduced-in-states-across-country/ [perma.cc/95HD-6X72]; see also Rachel 
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sippi’s bill died in committee, and New Jersey’s has not moved out of commit-
tee.259  Successful enaction of the bills pending in Hawaii,260 Maryland,261 Mas-
sachusetts,262 New Mexico,263 Rhode Island,264 New York,265 North Dakota,266 
and Washington267 would alleviate arguments supporting CCPA preemption 
due to national costs, especially considering five of the proposals support en-
forcement via a private cause of action.  Criticism of the federal CAN-SPAM 
Act bolsters the case for allowing such state-level regulation to continue.268  
However, state occupation of the field poses the additional problem of incon-
sistencies arising between states.  Such inconsistencies make state-by-state 
compliance a costly and inefficient task for entities operating in multiple states.  
The potential for inconsistencies is particularly apparent in Washington’s re-
cent proposal: the Washington Privacy Act (“WPA”), currently pending as SB 
5376.269  The WPA shares the informational privacy characteristics of the 
GDPR and the CCPA, however, it is more closely modeled after the GDPR.  
Among its differences with the CCPA, the WPA would require “opt-in” con-
sent for data “processing” and empower Washington citizens with additional 
rights related to the correction, alteration, and disclosure of collected personal 
information.270  
C.  Analyzing the Potential Case for Preemption of the CCPA 
There are many benefits and costs of federal preemption.271  As a general 
rule, however, “Congress should preempt state law only when the benefit it 
derives from doing so exceeds the cost that preemption imposes upon the 
state.”272  Additionally, preemption may be ideal “to displace a law that has 
  
 259. Marmor et al., supra note 255. 
 260. Id. (discussing Hawaii SB 418).  
 261. Id. (discussing Maryland SB 0613). 
 262. Id. (discussing Massachusetts SD 341).  
 263. Id. (discussing New Mexico SB 176).  
 264. Id. (discussing Rhode Island S0234). 
 265. Id. (discussing New York S00224).  
 266. Id. (discussing North Dakota HB 1485).  
 267. Id. (discussing Washington SB 5376).  
 268. See supra section IV.A. 
 269. Nancy Libin & Rachel Marmor, Washington Privacy Act, as Introduced in the 
Washington Legislature; A Rapid Q & A, State Across Country, DAVIS WRIGHT 
TREMAINE LLP (Sept. 21, 2019) https://www.dwt.com/Washington-Privacy-Act-as-in-
troduced-in-the-Washington-Legislature-A-Rapid-QA-02-06-2019/ [perma.cc/QF2L-
PNQ2]. 
 270. Id.  
 271. See Bellia, supra note 7. 
 272. Mikos, supra note 217, at 11; see generally Robert Cooter & Neil Siegal, Col-
lective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
115 (2010); Friedman, supra note 217, at 317; Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, 
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national consequences but that has not been subject to the national political 
process.”273  Common justifications for exercising federal preemptive power 
to centralize state regulations include: correcting regulations that create a “race 
to the bottom”; correcting for an inefficiency caused by the extraterritorial ex-
ternalities of a state’s regulation; and capturing the benefits uniform regulations 
yield.274  Concerning state privacy regulations, “[t]here certainly has been no 
race to the bottom.”275  However, the latter two concerns are relevant.  
Centralizing regulation at the federal level can prevent externalities 
“whenever a state governmental policy, law, or activity imposes costs or con-
fers benefits on residents of other states.”276  Negative externalities occur when 
the cost of one state’s regulation spillover to another state that receives none of 
the benefits.  The preceding Section detailed the CCPA’s great national costs, 
and these spillover burdens arguably provide the largest justification for federal 
preemptive action.  However, in the context of state-level internet regulations, 
extraterritorial costs may simply account for heterogeneity in values and bur-
dens of different states.277  Specifically, state regulations can facilitate effi-
ciency by imposing extraterritorial costs to address disproportionate harms suf-
fered within their specific forum.278  Known as the “matching principle,” that 
justification appears in state air-pollution regulations to support the efficiency 
of state regulations despite their disproportionate spillover effects.279  In other 
words, it may be economically beneficial for states to impose spillover costs 
that compensate for the disproportionate harms a national practice imposes 
within their forum.  Such economic considerations are difficult here given the 
inherent subjectivity of privacy.  One could argue that Californian’s do suffer 
disproportionately from the privacy harms caused by widespread industry prac-
tices.  California is the only state which constitutionally provides for an inal-
  
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994); Cath-
erine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521 (2012); David C. 
Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95 (2005). 
 273. Bellia, supra note 7, at 895, 899 (“Customers nationwide bear these costs, re-
gardless of whether non-California residents value privacy at the same level as Califor-
nia residents do.”). 
 274. See Friedman, supra note 217, at 406–09. 
 275. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 940–41 (“In other words, California privacy initia-
tives have not encouraged Nevada or other states, neighboring or otherwise, to enact 
weaker regulations in the same area.”). 
 276. Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In 
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 782 (1995). 
 277. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 100, at 796; Greve, supra note 99, at 1 (“State-
based policy innovation also facilitates adaptation to local needs, circumstances, and 
preferences.”). 
 278. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 100, at 796. 
 279. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 570, 587 (1996); see also Bellia, supra note 7, at 893.   
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ienable right of privacy against both state and private actors, so the greater pro-
portionate value California places on privacy is apparent.280  Moreover, even 
without considering the state’s heightened privacy values, California suffers 
greater harm from privacy abuses because “[o]ne out of eight Americans live 
in California.”281  Accordingly, one could plausibly argue that California suf-
fers disproportionately from the nation’s under-regulation of the collection and 
use of personal information, and the CCPA may therefore be justified as a func-
tion of the matching principle.  The same considerations support more abstract 
arguments for state-level privacy regulations.  Such a system would enable 
states to enact privacy laws catered to their constituents’ unique values, facili-
tating democratic self-governance.282  Federal preemptive action would restrict 
the ability of states to govern autonomously in accordance with those values.283 
The second argument for federal preemption is the need for uniformity.  
Assuming states follow the CCPA, inconsistencies between state regulatory 
requirements could raise compliance costs in favor of federal regulation,284 es-
pecially when such inconsistencies impose “high costs and little policy pay-
off.”285  In such circumstances, “centralization and uniformity . . . can reduce 
social cost.”286  In the context of digital industry, the “burden of potentially 
inconsistent regulations from other states is a very real concern.”287  The exist-
ence of variations does not render state regulatory landscapes inefficient per 
se.288  As mentioned above, the matching principle’s considerations are appli-
cable here.  Whether or not such inconsistencies warrant federal occupation has 
yet to be seen.  As the preceding Section discusses, states have begun moving 
into the area, but the potential for future variations between states cannot pres-
ently warrant preemption.  
The potential benefits of federal preemption must be weighed against the 
considerable costs.  The flexible experimentation of states, in addition to their 
  
 280. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; Sheehan v. S.F. 49ers, 201 P.3d 472, 479 (Cal. 2009) 
(holding the right to privacy applies to state actors and private parties). 
 281. Lovells, supra note 250. 
 282. Friedman, supra note 217, at 389 (“States, and their substate local govern-
ments, are closer to the people and provide an opportunity for greater citizen involve-
ment in the functional process of self-government.”); see Deborah Jones Merritt, The 
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 3–10 (1988) (arguing that state governments provide political and cultural di-
versity). 
 283. Friedman, supra note 217, at 403 (“Whatever the shifts in regulatory authority 
from the states to the national government, the fact is that the states remain independent 
political fora, with popular assemblies capable of expressing popular sentiment.  The 
states have performed this function throughout history.”). 
 284. Bellia, supra note 7, at 894. 
 285. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 942. 
 286. Calabresi, supra note 282, at 780. 
 287. Glosson, supra note 7, at 431. 
 288. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 101, at 796 (“The mere fact that measures 
undertaken by one jurisdiction have effects on citizens elsewhere, however, is by itself 
no objection to them.”); but see Kosseff, supra note 119, at 162–66. 
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capacity for rapid regulation, has been paramount for national regulation in the 
area of digital privacy. Those costs are exacerbated by the risk of a preemptive 
federal mandate ossifying in the fast-paced digital industry.  Sunsetting provi-
sions can ameliorate those concerns, but the historical lack of federal involve-
ment in digital privacy fields is apparent.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The CCPA marks the beginning of states broadly regulating the digital 
industry’s collection and use of personal information.  Pioneering state regula-
tion of the digital industry is nothing new, and state government’s regulatory 
activity in the area has numerous benefits for healthy regulation at the national 
level.  Future efforts to centralize such regulation under a federal mandate 
should not restrict the flexibility state regulators provide without adequate jus-
tification.  The benefits of any preemptive measure should be carefully com-
pared to the costs of in-state capabilities and autonomy.  As of now, congres-
sional action to occupy the area may be premature.  The next decade will show 
if the CCPA is gangbusters or just busted.  
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